Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern Air Lines: Can It Fly? by Cocanougher, Elizabeth L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
11-1-1989
Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern Air
Lines: Can It Fly?
Elizabeth L. Cocanougher
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth L. Cocanougher, Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern Air Lines: Can It Fly?, 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 539 (1989)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol44/iss2/10
Merging the RLA and the NLRA for Eastern
Air Lines: Can It Fly?
I. INTRODUCTION ... ....................................................... 539
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ................................................. 549
A. The Airlines' Deregulatory Evolution ................................. 549
B. The Deregulated Airline Marketplace ................................. 551
C. Employee Protection in the Deregulated Airline Market .................. 553
III. A COMPARISON OF RELATIVE POWER UNDER RLA AND NLRA DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES ................................................ 556
A . The Duty to Bargain .............................................. 556
B. Resolving Disputes During the Formation of an Initial Collective Bargaining
Agreem ent ........................................................ 557
C. Resolving Disputes During the Term of an Agreement ................... 563
I. MID-TERM COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ............................... 563
2. MID-TERM ARBITRATION .......................................... 565
D. Resolving Disputes After an Agreement Has Expired .................... 567
IV. EASTERN AIR LINES ....................................................... 568
A. Eastern Pilots II: Mid-Term Dispute Classification ..................... 569
B. The 1988 Furlough: Post-Expiration Dispute Classification and Union
A nim us .......................................................... 575
1. THE MAJOR-MINOR DETERMINATION ............................... 577
2. UNION ANIMUS ................................................... 583
C. The Trump Shuttle Sale: Effects Bargaining .......................... 588
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF NLRA MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
DOCTRINE TO THE RLA ............................................... 592
A. Doctrinal Considerations for Mid-Term Disputes ....................... 592
1. MID-TERM BARGAINING ............................................ 592
2. MID-TERM ARBITRATION .......................................... 599
B. Doctrinal Considerations for Post-Expiration Disputes ................... 605
1. POST-EXPIRATION BARGAINING .................................... 605
2. POST-EXPIRATION ARBITRATION .................................... 609
VI. A STREAMLINED STATUTE ................................................ 612
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Eastern Air Lines attempted to implement three busi-
ness decisions that would affect thousands of its employees: a con-
tract for the replacement of Eastern pilots in the event of a strike,' an
elimination of flights with corresponding employee furloughs, 2 and
the sale of Eastern's Northeast shuttle to businessman Donald
1. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots 11).
2. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 892-93 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough 11), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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Trump.3 In response, Eastern's unions4 filed suit in federal district
court to block implementation of the decisions.' The unions claimed
that Eastern must first bargain over the changes before implementing
them.6 Eastern contended that both existing and expired collective
bargaining agreements supported its actions7 and that it therefore
could act unilaterally without bargaining.8
These labor-management conflicts at Eastern Air Lines raise the
issue of whether disputes over management's prerogative to act uni-
laterally should be resolved in a bargaining or arbitration forum. The
Railway Labor Act (RLA),9 which governs railroads and airlines,
mandates that labor-management disputes be resolved through a two-
phased dispute resolution procedure, with each phase consisting pri-
marily of either collective bargaining or arbitration."° The RLA,
however, does not address the new need for managerial flexibility that
the deregulated airline market created. Courts have recognized the
problem and attempted to resolve it by incorporating doctrine from
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)," the RLA's statutory
3. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F. Supp. 865, 867-68 (D.D.C.
1988) (Trump Shuttle).
4. Eastern employees are represented by the International Association of Machinists
(IAM), the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and the Transport Workers Union of
America (TWU).
5. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1519; Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 893; Trump
Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 867-68.
6. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1519; Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 893; Trump
Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 867.
7. Eastern Pilots, 869 F.2d at 1520; Brief for Appellant at 14, Eastern Furlough II, 863
F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 88-7201, 88-7202, 88-7203).
8. Brief for Appellant at 14, Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 88-
7201, 88-7202, 88-7203).
9. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) (RLA).
10. See RLA §§ 2-10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152-160.
11. The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), was amended by the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, tit. I, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-200) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (amending and incorporating 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 and adding 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-200). The National Labor Relations
Act was further amended in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 5419 (1959). Hereinafter, the "Act" or
"NLRA" refers to the National Labor Relations Act, as amended; "LMRA" refers to the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has noted the differences between the policies underlying the formation of
the RLA and the NLRA:
The special situation in the railroad industry, where strong unions and
management had become used to dealing with each other, differed vitally from
the host of problems at which the Wagner Act was aimed-businesses of every
size and description, many with a history of strong anti-union bias and with
ample opportunity for strong-arm tactics. It was thus natural that the Wagner
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counterpart for primarily unregulated industries, into the RLA. The
Eastern cases demonstrate how the judiciary's ad hoc engrafting of
the policies underlying the NLRA onto the RLA's two-phased dis-
pute resolution procedure has often resulted in a distortion of the pol-
icy concerns of both statutes.
Under the RLA, whether to place a dispute in an arbitration or a
bargaining forum is a decision that has significant ramifications for
both labor and management. The RLA's first dispute resolution
phase, the "major" dispute classification, is a complex, lengthy pro-
cess12 geared toward the formation and amendment of collective
agreements.' 3 Simply stated, the major dispute procedure requires
collective bargaining between the parties, 4 followed by mediation,' 5
succeeded either by arbitration (if both parties agree), 6 or a cooling-
off period.' 7 Until the entire negotiation procedure is exhausted, the
parties must maintain the status quo:" management may not alter
working conditions unilaterally and labor may not strike.' 9 When
labor-management tensions are high, it is not uncommon for this pro-
cess to span more than a year.20
Act should stress administrative adjudication whereas the earlier Railway Labor
Act relied primarily on mediation.
Ruby v. American Airlines, 323 F.2d 248, 256 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913
(1964). For a historical discussion of the RLA, see infra Section II.
12. See RLA §§ 3-6, 10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-156, 160. The United States Supreme Court has
described the process as "almost interminable." Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v. United
Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148-49 (1969). Furthermore, "[t]he procedures of the [RLA] are
purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will
provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute." Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida
E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966).
13. See RLA §§ 3-6, 10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-156, 160. For a description of the major dispute
procedure, see infra note 117.
14. See RLA §§ 2(Fourth), 6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152(Fourth), 156.
15. RLA §§ 4-6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 154-156.
16. RLA § 7, 45 U.S.C. § 157. Arbitration, in turn, may be followed by presidential
intervention if the dispute threatens to disrupt commerce. RLA § 5(First)(b), 45 U.S.C.
§ 155(First)(b); see also infra note 117.
17. RLA § 5(First)(b), 45 U.S.C. § 155(First)(b).
18. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots H); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (Eastern Furlough II), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D.D.C. 1988) (Trump
Shuttle). The status quo requirement compels the parties "to preserve and maintain
unchanged those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which
were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related
to that dispute." Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 152-53
(1969). For a discussion of the status quo requirement, see infra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
19. See RLA § 5(First), 45 U.S.C. § 155; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River
& Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1956).
20. See infra note 477.
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Because the potential length of the major dispute resolution pro-
cedure is coupled with the status quo requirement, the party who
desires a change in working conditions may concede certain issues in
order to obtain a new contract more quickly. In the Eastern cases,
the proposed changes were financially beneficial for management but
detrimental for labor. Classification of the disputes as major would
have given labor both the leverages of time and the status quo, while
limiting management's capacity to implement its decisions. Conse-
quently, unions argue that disputes, such as the Eastern cases high-
lighted in this Comment, are major.E'
The minor dispute procedure, the RLA's second phase of dispute
resolution, focuses on grievance arbitration to resolve disputes that
arise over contractual interpretations.22 After parties have finalized
the terms of their collective agreement through the major dispute pro-
cedure, they use the minor procedure to resolve subsequent disagree-
ments over disputes arising under the agreement. Thus, the RLA's
two-phased resolution process rests on the assumption that the parties
first set the terms of their relationship by bargaining over the sub-
stance of the agreement and then use the minor dispute resolution
procedure to resolve disputes over the agreement's meaning.
The choice of forum has great implications on the relative power
of the parties. Management typically has more bargaining leverage
during minor disputes because it is not statutorily obligated to main-
tain the status quo pending arbitration; it may act unilaterally during
the pendency of an adjustment board's ruling while labor is prevented
from reacting with a strike.23 In the Eastern cases, Eastern's manage-
ment contended that the disputes fell within expansive interpretations
of its right to act under present or expired collective bargaining agree-
ments, and thus the disputes were "minor."24
This distinction between major and minor disputes-between
contract formation and amendment on the one hand and contract
interpretation on the other-may be phrased precisely. Yet in appli-
cation, it is often difficult to discern within which classification a given
dispute should fall. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has observed: "A refusal to follow apparently clear
contractual language could be a unilateral modification of the con-
tract, thereby generating a major dispute, or a bold and possibly erro-
21. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1519; Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 893; Trump
Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 867.
22. For a description of the minor dispute procedure, see infra note 171.
23. See infra notes 418-19 and accompanying text.
24. Eastern Pilots H, 869 F.2d at 1520; Brief for Appellant at 8, Eastern Furlough II, 863
F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 88-7201, 88-7202, 88-7203).
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neous interpretation of the contract, thereby generating a minor
dispute."25
Much of the confusion about distinguishing between major and
minor disputes has arisen because the two terms, a judicial gloss on
the RLA,26 have evolved definitionally through decades of change in
the railroad and airline industries. Congress enacted the RLA as a
mechanism for resolving labor disputes and preventing strikes in the
regulated railroad industry. 27 The statute was structured to accom-
modate an industry that was not only vital to commerce, but was also
known for its strong labor presence. 2 The RLA's exhaustive negotia-
tion procedures and the government's regulation of the railroad
industry produced a situation in which the relative economic power of
the parties was more balanced than was the case with the NLRA.
The RLA's complex bargaining and arbitration procedures reflect the
notion that the parties should be compelled to make every effort to
resolve their differences before resorting to commerce-crippling eco-
nomic warfare.
The deregulation of airlines a decade ago, however, fostered a
new tension in the characterization of disputes.29 The set of legal con-
cepts that grew out of a labor environment that was protected by gov-
ernment regulation was ill-adapted for resolving disputes in a newly
competitive business environment.30 In today's market, manage-
ment's struggle to reduce labor costs-a move it views as crucial for
25. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 768 F.2d 914, 920 (7th
Cir. 1985).
26. The United States Supreme Court first applied the terms "major" and "minor" to the
RLA's dispute procedures in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
27. Rehmus, Evolution of Legislation Affecting Collective Bargaining in the Railroad and
Airline Industries, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES 2 (1976); see infra note 66.
28. Rehmus, supra note 27, at 2. The statute incorporated the policy that the federal
government had the right to regulate the economic life of industries vital to the country's
economy. Id.
29. See infra Section II.
30. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text. Although the rail industry is still
partially regulated, the United States Supreme Court noted the increasing deregulation of
railroads when it allowed railroad employers a greater range of freedom from labor constraints
than in the past. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584,
2596-97 (1989) (P&LE II). In P&LE II, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's application of
management-protective NLRA doctrine, which was formulated for deregulated industries, to
the regulated railroad industry. Id. at 2602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
emphasized the fact that railroads are still regulated when he dissented from the Supreme
Court's holding that a railroad's sale of assets does not require notice to a union or imposition
of the status quo during bargaining over the sale's effects on employees (effects bargaining). Id.
at 2599-2603. For a further discussion of P&LE 11, see infra notes 324-26 & 371-82 and
accompanying text, and infra Section V(B)(1).
1989]
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profitability and survival3 '-thrusts labor into the more defensive bar-
gaining posture of attempting to preserve jobs, wages, and benefits.32
Consequently, the protracted nature of collective bargaining under
the major dispute classification inhibits management's ability to react
to market forces and provides labor with considerable bargaining lev-
erage with which to counter management's demands for
concessions.33
In response to the heightened dispute resolution tension, federal
courts have borrowed an NLRA policy which, in a similarly competi-
tive marketplace, has enlarged management's capacity to quickly
respond to market forces. 34 The result under both the NLRA and the
RLA is that more disputes are designated arbitrable. Under both
statutes, the arbitration process permits management to implement
business decisions while the dispute is processed through contractual
grievance procedures. 3' In the NLRA context, the deferral of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to grievance arbitration
effectively has placed unfair labor practice charges that overlap with
contractual rights in the hands of arbitrators. 36 Additionally, courts
have restricted labor's statutory right to force management to bargain
by excluding many of management's business restructuring decisions
from mandatory bargaining.37
Under the RLA, the presumption of arbitrability produces a
somewhat different balance of power and dissimilar results. The effect
of applying the NLRA policy of strengthening management rights to
the RLA has been to shift to the arbitration forum disputes that previ-
ously were resolved through collective bargaining. Because the choice
of an arbitration or bargaining forum greatly affects the contractual
rights and relative power of the parties, it is necessary to apply the
RLA with an eye toward distinguishing between rules that govern
labor-management relations when a collective bargaining agreement
is in effect, from rules that operate when parties continue to bargain
31. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
32. See Curtin, Labor Mediation: A Management View, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF:
AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 185, 191 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988); Rosen,
A Union Perspective, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE
DEREGULATION 11, 12 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
33. See infra notes 117-24 & 146-50 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 363-84 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 171.
36. Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract
and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237 (1989).
37. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958). For a
discussion of the mandatory-permissive distinction under the NLRA, see infra notes 129-45
and accompanying text.
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over a new collective agreement after expiration of the old one. The
RLA, which was designed to accommodate the railroads' unexpiring
agreements, does not address the issue of whether collective agree-
ments are in force or expired.38
Airlines, however, unlike railroads, typically employ collective
bargaining agreements that expire in the sense that the parties agree
that the contract will be open for amendment on certain dates. 39 This
fact and the deregulation of airlines have prompted courts to seek
more effective responses to labor disputes than the nearly automatic
triggering of major disputes that railroads used in the past.'
Recently, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the trend
among federal courts of appeals that it is appropriate to borrow the
NLRA's policy protecting management in order to place an RLA
controversy arising during the mid-term stage of a collective agree-
ment into the minor classification's grievance arbitration procedure. 1
The move provides management with the right to implement changes
while it participates in the minor classification's grievance arbitration
procedure.42 The Supreme Court designated as minor any managerial
actions that "arguably" fall within the provisions of existing collective
bargaining agreements.43
Among the courts of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has been at the forefront of the
incorporation of NLRA doctrine into the RLA. The District of
Columbia Circuit has drawn the heaviest presumption to date-going
beyond the Supreme Court's recent holding-that RLA disputes aris-
ing during the term of existing agreements are arbitrable. In Air Line
Pilots Association International v. Eastern Air Lines (Eastern Pilots
11),14 the court held that a mid-term dispute is minor even if a party's
38. The RLA was designed instead to accommodate the railroad industry's custom of
using collective bargaining agreements that do not expire but which are amendable when
unions serve notice on management that they wish to bargain over an issue through the major
dispute procedure. See infra notes 445-51 and accompanying text. Because the RLA was first
applied only to the open-end agreements of the regulated railroad industry, early courts
interpreted the statute as requiring management to bargain over virtually any union challenges
to "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" until the major dispute procedure was
exhausted. RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156; see infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 439-51 and accompanying text.
40. Id.
41. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
For a discussion of the trend among the federal appellate courts, see infra notes 371-79 and
accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 412-17 and accompanying text.
43. Consolidated, 109 S. Ct. at 2477.
44. 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Eastern Pilots I, see infra Section
Ill(A).
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claim of contractual justification for its position is frivolous. 45 Thus,
according to the District of Columbia Circuit, mid-term disputes aris-
ing under the RLA would be presumptively minor unless a union
could establish a bad faith claim of contractual justification on the
part of its employer.
In Air Line Pilots Association International v. Eastern Air Lines
(Eastern Furlough II),46 the District of Columbia Circuit made
another bold move by extending the presumption of arbitrability into
collective agreements' post-expiration periods .4  The court deter-
mined that the status quo concept, which examines past practices to
impose a freeze on working conditions during the major dispute pro-
cedure, required an examination of the parties' past practices in order
to determine whether a post-expiration dispute was minor.48 In so
concluding, the court collapsed the two separate inquiries of status
quo and dispute classification into one query that expansively inter-
preted management rights by relying on an expired collective bargain-
ing agreement and the past practices of the parties. This move not
only confused the delineation between the status quo and the classifi-
cation of the dispute, but also shifted the parties' relative power and
rights during the post-expiration period. Additionally, by determin-
ing that the dispute was permitted by the collective agreements, the
court encroached on the authority of an arbitration board to decide
the merits of the claim of contractual justification.
In yet another precedential step, the Eastern Furlough II court
used pro-management NLRA policy49 to hold that the record did not
support the union's claims that management's actions were motivated
by impermissible union animus. 5° The court held that if any animus
was present, it was negated by legitimate financial considerations.5
45. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1522. The court held that in order to be subject to the
major dispute procedure, a party's proposed action must not only "repudiate" an existing
collective bargaining agreement, but it also must be grounded on a contractual justification
that is "so inherently unreasonable as to amount to bad faith." Id. at 1523 (quoting Southern
Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 384 F.2d 323, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
46. 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
47. Id. at 898-900.
48. Id. The court concluded that an examination of the parties' past practices and
collective bargaining agreements indicated that the parties had implicitly agreed to the
furloughs. Id. at 896-900. For a discussion of the parties' relative power in minor disputes, see
infra notes 418-19 and accompanying text.
49. The court borrowed from the NLRB's Wright Line principle, which permits a
legitimate business justification to overcome a union animus charge. Wright Line, a Div. of
Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
50. Eastern Furlough I, 863 F.2d at 911-13., The RLA forbids management from using
coercive anti-union action. See id. at 901.
51. Id. at 911-13.
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Disagreeing over the proper methodology for classifying post-expira-
tion disputes and for resolving the union animus issue, a badly frac-
tured en banc court52 denied a petition for review.53
Following the Eastern Furlough II court's lead, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, in Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion International v. Eastern Air Lines (Trump Shuttle),54 applied
NLRA doctrine to an asset transfer dispute. 5 The district court held
that the Trump Shuttle sale was a permissible use of management pre-
rogative that was within the contemplation of the expired collective
bargaining agreements; thus, the sale presented a minor dispute.5 6
The court also found that post-transaction arbitration over the sale's
effects on employees satisfied the NLRA's requirement that effects
bargaining be meaningful.5 It further concluded that financial con-
siderations negated any possible anti-union motivation for manage-
ment's decisions.58
The merger of NLRA and RLA statutory doctrines in order to
create a presumption of arbitrability during both existing and post-
52. Judge Mikva noted:
This case has spawned, at the en banc stage alone, six separate statements
involving eight judges on our court. . . . There have appeared four different
interpretations of how the Railway Labor Act's system for classifying disputes as
"major" or "minor" ought to be applied in this case: the panel believes the
dispute here is "minor"; Judge Silberman thinks it may be "major," but contends
that classifying it as "major" would not alter the outcome of the case; Judge
Edwards has proposed that the dispute may be both "major" and "minor"; and I
have argued that the dispute is "major" and that this classification would affect
the result. There are also divisions among us in our understandings of the
appropriate role of the Wright Line test in the context of large-scale corporate
restructurings under the Railway Labor Act. These disparate views, it seems to
me, suggest that the panel opinion cannot serve as any significant guidepost in
this circuit on these difficult and unsettled areas of law.
Id. at 919 (Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
53. Id. at 913 (denial of a rehearing en banc).
54. 701 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1988).
55. Id. at 867.
56. See id. at 873-74, 878-80.
57. Id. at 876. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the
Supreme Court held that bargaining over the effects of a sale must be meaningful and must
take place at a meaningful time. Id. at 681-82.
58. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 877-78. The Supreme Court recently clarified the
effects bargaining standard for the RLA by. holding that when a collective agreement is silent
regarding management's duty to bargain over a sale of assets, the RLA imposes a duty to
bargain over effects only to the extent that the terms of the sale are not impacted. Pittsburgh
& L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE H). The
Court relied on NLRA precedent to arrive at its holding. Id. at 2595-99. Thus, the Court
placed effects bargaining in the bargaining forum rather than in the arbitration forum, as had
the Trump Shuttle court, but it refused to impose the status quo pending bargaining, an action
that would have prevented management from going forward with the sale. Id. at 2597.
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expiration contract periods is not an optimal solution to the judici-
ary's concern that the RLA's major dispute procedure is too cumber-
some for today's competitive marketplace. In comparison, the
NLRA's bargaining process, like the RLA's, requires maintenance of
the status quo during the resolution of contract formation and amend-
ment issues.5 9 The NLRA, however, mandates that the parties bar-
gain collectively to impasse, a point that is merely the first stage of the
RLA's bargaining procedure.' This shorter time frame in the NLRA
context makes the threat of economic pressure a more imminent and
therefore more powerful weapon, with the relative bargaining power
shifting to the economically stronger party. 6' Under the RLA, how-
ever, the leverage of time proves more consistently to labor's advan-
tage in the current concession bargaining atmosphere of the
deregulated airline industry.62
Thus, both the time and economic aspects of the major dispute
procedure often provide labor with leverage at the expense of the air-
lines' opportunity for profitibility or survival. On the other hand,
using a grievance-oriented procedure in a collective agreement's post-
expiration period in order to decide reorganizational issues that are
not explicitly reserved to management in an existing agreement is an
equally unbalanced approach. Classification of a dispute over statuto-
rily defined bargaining topics 63 as minor frees management to make
unilateral decisions while processing the dispute through arbitra-
tion;64 the classification, however, does not provide labor with the
59. Subsections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA require an employer to bargain collectively
with employee representatives over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." NLRA § 8(a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d). Section 8(a)(5) provides: "(a)
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees .... " NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The
obligation to bargain collectively is defined in Section 8(d) of the NLRA as the obligation to
bargain in good faith but without compulsion or binding results. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). As with the RLA, judicial interpretation of the NLRA requires that management
and labor maintain the status quo while bargaining over contract formation and amendment.
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-48 (1962); International Woodworkers, Local 3-10 v.
NLRB, 380 F.2d 628, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1967); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 242
N.L.R.B. 462, 462 (1979).
60. Impasse is the point at which the parties' negotiations are deadlocked. See infra note
121. For a discussion of the parties' relative power during NLRA collective bargaining, see
infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
61. The balance of relative negotiating power under the arbitration procedures of the two
statutes is more similar. Under both the RLA and the NLRA, management is effectively free
to act while labor is prevented from striking. See infra notes 410-19 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Section Ill(D).
63. The RLA considers "wages, hours, and working conditions" to be the topics over
which parties must bargain. RLA § 2(First), (Sixth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First), (Sixth); see infra
notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
64. A status quo injunction will prevent management's unilateral action, but the extent of
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protection of the status quo and prevents labor from striking in
response to the decision. Thus, in the post-expiration time frame,
placement of the statutorily mandated topics of wages, hours, and
working conditions in the arbitration forum often leaves labor with
little power to protect its livelihood.65
Along with addressing the major-minor classifications, the East-
ern Air Lines cases present broader questions. To what extent is the
presumption of arbitrability appropriately applied to the Railway
Labor Act in mid-term and post-expiration disputes? Does the RLA
have the flexibility to more effectively accommodate the rights of
management and labor in the deregulated airline market? Perhaps
nowhere is a balance between the concerns of management and labor
so difficult to strike under the RLA as in the Eastern cases, in which
labor sought to protect its livelihood by bargaining with a financially
distraught carrier over restructuring decisions.
This Comment examines the shift in bargaining power created by
carrier restructuring decisions, as exemplified by the Eastern Air
Lines cases. Section II of this Comment briefly examines the conse-
quences of deregulation on labor relations in the airline industry. The
discussion in Section III compares the relative balance of power
between management and labor with respect to management preroga-
tive issues under the dispute procedures of the NLRA and RLA. Sec-
tion IV focuses on Eastern's struggle with its unions to resolve
subcontracting, furlough, and asset transfer disputes. The analysis in
Section V describes how the various courts' interpretations of the
NLRA and RLA have often produced results that are at odds with
the policy concerns of the statutes. Finally, Section VI of this Com-
ment concludes that a streamlined version of the RLA may produce
results that are more reflective of policy and more responsive to the
deregulated market.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Airlines' Deregulatory Evolution
Although the RLA once encompassed railroads and airlines
when they were both regulated industries,66 the common paths of the
the injunction's availability is not clear. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines,
869 F.2d 1518, 1519 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Pilots II).
65. Although labor may be at a disadvantage in the arbitral setting because of
management's freedom to act, the parties' assessment of available remedies has a bearing on
the parties' willingness to arbitrate. It is unlikely that an arbitration board would rectify a
managerial action by awarding a union back pay, for example, if the award would be fatal to a
financially crippled employer.
66. Railroad regulation was effected by the Interstat Commerce Act, now codified at 49
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carriers eventually diverged.67 In 1978, Congress examined the ineffi-
ciency of the airline industry and withdrew its protection.68 After a
short deregulation phase-in, airlines were permitted to fly wherever
they wanted for whatever prices they wished to charge.6 9 New, non-
unionized carriers entered the arena with cut-rate prices, thereby
heightening the battle for passengers and creating pressure on other
airlines at the bargaining table.7°
The deregulation turmoil created unexpected casualties among
both carriers and unions.71 In the decade since deregulation, nearly
U.S.C. §§ 10,101-11,917 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Airline regulation was pursuant to the Civil
Aeronautics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), which was later modified by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (current version at 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (Supp. III 1985)). When the RLA was enacted in 1926, railroads
enjoyed a virtual monopoly on transportation. Wilner, Railroads and the Marketplace, 16
TRANSP. L.J. 291, 292 (1988). The RLA was drafted to promote collective bargaining in the
thriving railroad industry and thereby prevent crippling railroad strikes. See Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 833 F.2d 700, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Detroit &
T. Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 154 (1969)).
In 1936, Congress expanded the RLA to encompass the infant airline industry. Ch. 166,
49 Stat. 1189 (1936). This sheltering of the two industries under one statutory umbrella was a
natural expansion of the RLA, given the extensive governmental regulation of railroads and, to
a somewhat lesser extent, airlines. See Comment, Airline Labor Policy, the Stepchild of the
Railway Labor Act, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 461 (1951). In both industries, inefficiently operated
.carriers were able to transfer much of their debt (including labor costs) to customers through
noncompetitive fare structures; carriers thereby averted strikes. E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D.
KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 96 (1985).
67. With the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, airlines competed in a
more volatile marketplace than did railroads. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). Regulatory
agencies and courts interpreted congressional policy as permitting "competition among
carriers and reliance upon market forces to meet the needs of the public." Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The RLA now
encompasses two dissimilar industries: railroads, which have experienced a virtual steady
decline in employment since 1920, and airlines, which have almost as steadily seen their
employment rate grow. Northrup, Airline Labor Protective Provisions.- An Economic Analysis,
53 J. AIR L. & COM. 401, 415 (1987).
68. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 states in its preamble that it was enacted to
"encourage, develop and attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive
market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air services." Pub. L. No. 95-504,
92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). See Kahn, In Defense of
Deregulation, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE
DEREGULATION 343 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
69. Kahn, Introduction, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE
DEREGULATION I (J. McKelvey ed. 1988). For a discussion of the new competitive
environment, see Rosen, supra note 32, at 12-15.
70. See Kahn, supra note 69, at 3; Rosen, supra note 32, at 13.
71. See Grebey, A Management Perspective, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR
RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 37, 39 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988); Kahn, supra note 68, at
343-47; Kahn, supra note 69, at 2.
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200 airlines have failed.7 2 In spite of a sixty-three percent rise in air-
line passenger traffic,73 there has been an increase of less than nine
percent in employment.74 Furthermore, fewer employers now control
a greater part of the business than a decade ago.75 Unions, however,
have begun rebuilding from the period of heavy concessions, and
today all but two major carriers are unionized.76
B. The Deregulated Airline Marketplace
The deregulated airline market demands vastly different business
strategies than did the regulated airline market. The regulated mar-
ket discouraged efficient operations.77 For example, salary increases
that were demanded on a unified basis by unions at various carriers
could be passed on to passengers through fare increases. 7s Addition-
72. Greenberg, Did Deregulation Help Travelers? Well, Yes and No, Miami Herald, Oct.
16, 1988, at J9, col. 1.
73. The number of airline passengers has increased from 275 million to 447 million since
deregulation. Carroll, Airline Deregulation Has "Mixed" Results, Miami Herald, Oct. 24,
1988, at Al, col. 1 (citing the Air Transport Association as authority).
74. McDonald, Airline Management Prerogative in the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 869, 927 (1987).
75. See Kahn, supra note 69, at 3-6.
While airlines experienced competition from within the airline industry, railroads faced
competition from without the railroad industry. The railroad was the first American industry
to be regulated when the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was created more than a
century ago; its main competition was from horse-drawn wagons and steamboats. Wilner,
supra note 66, at 292. Other forms of transportation soon emerged, however, and railroads
competed ineffectively because they were constrained by rigid regulatory controls. See id. at
296-302. Their near-monopoly on transportation deteriorated. Id. Finally, in 1980, the
Staggers Rail Act effected partial deregulation, expediting approval of sales of railroads,
particularly those in danger of failing. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat.
1895. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4110, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3978, 4110. The Staggers Rail Act was largely successful
but, regrettably, a half-century overdue. Wilner, supra note 66, at 292-95.
At present, profits in the railroad industry remain substandard. Id. at 309-16. The
industry has weathered its 21% bankruptcy rate of a decade ago, but many carriers continue to
struggle. Id. at 330. Union rights are also uncertain. Congress has mandated continued
protection of railroad employee interests; however, the scope of that mandate, in light of other
apparently conflicting statutory mandates, is unclear. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 855 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 493
(1988); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.
1988) (P&LE I), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE II). Still, the ICC may not "relieve a
carrier of its obligation to protect the interests of employees," even though it may exempt
certain carrier actions from regulation. 49 U.S.C. § 10,505(g)(2) (1982).
76. See Kahn, supra note 69, at 6. Unions have regained part of their strength through
tighter labor markets, particularly for pilots, and through intervention in airline mergers. Id.
The major non-unionized carriers are Continental Airlines (Eastern Air Lines' sister carrier)
and Delta Air Lines (where only pilots and dispatchers are affiliated with a union). Id.
77. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 74, at 918.
78. Cappelli, An Economist's Perspective, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR
RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 49, 52 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
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ally, inefficient carriers often were awarded new routes in order to
maintain a competitive balance in the industry.79 During this regu-
lated period, the government granted increased fares to cover union
demands.80 There was little incentive for carriers to risk strikes by
rejecting union demands, and little incentive for unions to agree to
81concessions. Market stability fostered job stability and high wages.
Against this backdrop, Congress ordered deregulation and
removed most of the government controls over market entry and exit,
routes, and fares.82 The resulting market was a chaotic free-for-all in
comparison with the one it replaced. 3 This new market, unlike its
regulated predecessor, eliminated inefficient carriers.84 Surviving car-
riers fought to strengthen their market positions by merging,85 closing
bases,86 selling routes,87 and contracting out support work.
8
Today, fewer carriers share more of the market than a decade
ago.8 9 Despite a slight increase in overall airline employment and
79. McDonald, supra note 74, at 918 (citing J. MEYER, C. OSTER, I. MORGAN, B.
BERMAN & D. STRASSMAN, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: THE EARLY EXPERIENCE 213-14
(1981)).
80. Crandall, The Airlines: On Track or Off Course?, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF:
AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 349, 350 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
81. Id.
82. International routes are still regulated. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (Supp. 1 1983). Service
to small communities also continues to be federally mandated. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1389 (Supp. I
1983).
83. Carroll, supra note 73, at A6, col. 1.
84. For a discussion of the shake-out in the airline industry following deregulation, see
Rosen, supra note 32, at 18-29.
85. Recent mergers include Southwest with Muse, Northwest with Republic, Pan
American with National, Texas Air with Eastern, TWA with Ozark, Frontier with People
Express, People Express with Britt and PBA, Delta with Western, Alaska with Jet America,
Texas Air with People Express, American with Air California, Alaska with Horizon, and
USAir with PSA. Kahn, supra note 69, at 4-5. Former Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman
Alfred Kahn has criticized the federal government for failing to apply antitrust laws to bar the
formation of airline oligopolies. Kahn, supra note 68, at 344-47. Instead, approval of mergers
was transferred to the Department of Transportation, which has overridden objections against
mergers made by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Id.
86. See, e.g., Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, 502 F.
Supp. 1013 (D.D.C. 1980).
87. For example, Braniff sold its Latin American route system to Eastern Air Lines, and
Pan Am sold its Pacific Division to United Air Lines. Adams, Seniority Integration: A
Management Perspective, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE
DEREGULATION 163, 164-65 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
88. Qantas Airways, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2312 (1984).
89. Before deregulation, the top nine airlines shared about 85% of the domestic passenger
market. Kahn, supra note 69, at 5. Today, the top six airlines-Texas Air, United, American,
Delta, Northwest, and TWA-share roughly 81% of that market. Id. Among the carriers
who fell victim to deregulation were Air Florida, People Express, New York Air, Western
Airlines, Jet America, Frontier Airlines, Republic Airlines, PSA, AirCal, and Ozark Airlines.
Carroll, supra note 73, at A6, col. 1-2; Winpisinger, What Lies Ahead for Labor?, in CLEARED
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average compensation, 9° the intense competition (particularly from
non-unionized carriers with lower labor costs), continues to force
many unions to concede a substantial amount of the jobs, wages, and
benefits that they enjoyed in the regulated market. 91 Much of the
financial relief granted by labor is used to subsidize fare wars and to
diversify, rather than to improve carrier operations.92 In response,
labor has begun to question management's actions, demand changes
in operating procedures and, in some instances, demand changes in
management as well. 93
C. Employee Protection in the Deregulated Airline Market
Historically, the national policy of airline employee protection
largely mirrored that of the railroad industry. The first statutory
source of airline regulation, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
(CAA),94 was similar in many respects to its railway counterpart, the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA).95 Unlike the ICA, however,
the CAA did not explicitly require airlines to protect their employees
when approving consolidations, mergers, route transfers, and other
transactions.96 Instead, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) derived
that protection from the "public interest" requirement of the CAA, 97
thereby imposing employee protection requirements on airlines that
FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 365, 368 (J. McKelvey
ed. 1988).
90. Northrup, supra note 67, at 429.
91. Crandall, supra note 80, at 350.
92. Rosen, supra note 32, at 24.
93. Id.
94. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
95. Law of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104.
96. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) read into Section 407 of the
Transportation Act of 1920 an authorization to protect the interests of railroad employees who
might lose jobs, wages, or benefits in the event of consolidations and asset transfers.
McDonald, supra note 74, at 887-88. The United States Supreme Court upheld the ICC's
interpretation of the Transportation Act, articulating a national policy of protecting labor
morale in a commercially critical industry. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 234-36
(1939). One year later, Congress enacted the Transportation Act of 1940 which provided that,
as a condition of approval of railroad transactions, the ICC "shall require a fair and equitable
arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected." Transportation Act
of 1940, ch. 722, § 7, § 407, 54 Stat. 898, 906 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 11,347
(Supp. V 1987)). The revised section provides that any transaction requiring the ICC's
approval must incorporate an arrangement requiring "that the employees of the affected rail
carrier will not be in a worse position related to their employment as a result of the transaction
during the 4 years following [the action]." 49 U.S.C. § 11,347 (Supp. V 1987).
97. Ch. 601, § 401, 52 Stat. 973, 989. Section 401(i) of the CAA provided that "[n]o
certificate may be transferred unless such transfer is approved by the Authority as being
consistent with the public interest."
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were similar to those required in the railroad industry. The judiciary
applied to airlines the ICA's policy of giving preferential treatment to
employees in order to avoid the commercial disruption that would
occur through strikes.98
The deregulation of airlines, however, brought a narrower focus
to the public interest requirement of airline transactions.99 The fear of
interrupted commerce was no longer a compelling factor in averting
airline labor strikes.1l° The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)",'
appears to reflect a policy of reduced employee protection in its inter-
pretation of the public interest. Instead of employee protection, the
ADA advocates efficient, low-priced air service 1°2 and "the need to
encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions for air carri-
ers.' 0 3 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has noted, the old policy of special employee pro-
tection for airlines is "out of step with the new national policy favor-
ing competition among carriers and reliance upon market forces to
meet the needs of the public."10' The CAB's successor, the
Department of Transportation (DOT), 10 has also adopted this
entrepreneurial policy. 106
98. See Western Air Lines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding that the
reasoning in United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 238 (1939), which permitted the ICC to
impose labor protective provisions upon railroad mergers and consolidations notwithstanding
the absence of express statutory authority, is in large part equally applicable to the airline
industry). For a history of employee protection, see S. ROSENFIELD, LABOR PROTECTIVE
PROVISIONS IN AIRLINE MERGERS (1981); McDonald, supra note 74, at 922-30; Nichols &
Kennedy, Seniority Integration in the Absence of Mandatory Labor Protective Provisions, in
CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 143 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1988).
99. See McDonald, supra note 74, at 923.
100. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
101. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
102. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(3) (1982).
103. Id.
104. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172, 176-77 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
105. The Department of Transportation (DOT) replaced the CAB as the agency responsible
for authorizing mergers, sales, and acquisitions. Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil
Aeronautics Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 93 (1979);
Nichols & Kennedy, supra note 98, at 149. The CAB was phased out in a procedure
culminating in 1984. Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551
(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
106. The CAB did order labor protective provisions in at least four merger cases that
occurred after deregulation, reasoning that unions had not had sufficient time to respond to the
changed circumstances. See Western Air Lines, Control by AFSI, 93 C.A.B. 545, 568 (1982);
Airwest, Acquisition by Republic Airlines, 86 C.A.B. 1971, 1976 (1980); Seaboard Acquisition
by Tiger Int'l, 86 C.A.B, 29, 117 (1980); National Airlines Acquisition, 84 C.A.B. 408, 474
(1979). With those exceptions, however, the CAB and DOT have consistently refused to
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The CAB and the DOT determined that labor protective provi-
sions, which may be imposed as a condition to the approval of airline
mergers, are only appropriate when labor unrest threatens a sys-
temwide disruption of the airways. 107 Except in the event of inter-
airline sympathy strikes, a nationwide disruption is improbable
because deregulation permits any carrier to provide the service nor-
mally provided by a strike-ridden carrier, as is the case in most
industries.10 8
Considering the apparent governmental recognition of a reduced
need to prevent strikes in the airline industry, the extent to which the
RLA continues to mandate a voice for airline employees in opera-
tional decisionmaking remains an unsettled question. Theoretically,
carriers recognize that employees' active participation and full com-
mitment is essential for the successful operation of a service indus-
try.' 09 Labor's corresponding assumption is that its opportunities for
impose labor protective restrictions as a condition to merger. See American Airlines, No.
44498 (D.O.T. Mar. 30, 1987) (LEXIS, Trans library, Dotav file) (American's takeover of Air
California); Texas Air Corp., No. 44365 (D.O.T. Oct. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Trans library, Dotav
file) (Texas Air's takeover of People Express); Texas Air Corp., No. 44346 (D.O.T. Oct. 1,
1986) (LEXIS, Trans library, Dotav file) (Texas Air acquired control of Eastern Air Lines);
NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, No. 43754 (D.O.T. July 31, 1986) (LEXIS, Trans library,
Dotav file) (Northwest acquired Republic); Pacific Div. Transfer Case, No. 43065 (D.O.T.
Dec. 2, 1985) (LEXIS, Trans library, Dotav file) (United's purchase of Pan American's Pacific
routes).
When Texas Air Corporation acquired Eastern Air Lines, the DOT expressly rejected an
argument by the union that a potential strike would disrupt the national air transportation
system. Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, No. 44346 (D.O.T. Aug. 26, 1986) (LEXIS,
Trans library, Dotav file). The DOT found that "the labor parties had failed to show that
LPP's [Labor Protective Provisions] would be necessary to prevent labor strife that would
disrupt the national air transportation system or, due to special circumstances, for the
encouragement of fair wages and working conditions." Id. at 4. The DOT made a similar
finding in its approval of Pan American's sale of its Pacific routes to United. Pacific Div.
Transfer Case, No. 43065 (D.O.T. Oct. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, Trans library, Dotav file), aff'd sub
nom. Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Department of Transp., 803 F.2d 1029 (9th
Cir. 1986).
107. See McDonald, supra note 74, at 923-24; Nichols & Kennedy, supra note 98, at 149-50;
see, e.g., Transamerica Corp., No. 42035 (C.A.B. Dec. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, Trans library, Cab
file); Frontier Horizon, Inc., Fitness Investigation, No. 41640 (C.A.B. Jan. 6, 1984) (LEXIS,
Trans library, Cab file); New York Air, Fitness Investigation, 87 C.A.B. 677 (1980), aff'd sub
nom. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 643 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1981).
108. The United States Supreme Court has held that, consistent with the purposes of the
RLA, the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes injunctions over secondary activity. Burlington
Northern R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 107 S. Ct. 1841, 1854-55
(1987). No-strike clauses, however, may prevent secondary picketing. During the IAM strike
at Eastern Air Lines that began on March 4, 1989, courts issued preliminary injunctions
preventing secondary activity at other carriers in support of the IAM strike until no-strike
clauses could be interpreted in the minor dispute setting. See Northwest Airlines v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 712 F. Supp. 732 (D. Minn. 1989); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. United Airlines, No. 89-0514, 89-0556, 89-0557 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1989).
109. Crandall, supra note 80, at 351.
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increased wages and benefits depend on a carrier's ability to grow and
be profitable." 0 To the extent that these assumptions fade in the face
of reality, however, a workable dispute resolution mechanism must
strike a balance between the rights of the two parties without creating
undue hardship for either.
III. A COMPARISON OF RELATIVE POWER UNDER RLA AND
NLRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
A. The Duty to Bargain
Congress established rules for collective bargaining within indus-
tries governed by the NLRA and the RLA in order to provide a
mechanism by which workers could participate in the establishment
and administration of rules governing the workplace. " The two stat-
utes were structured to accomodate two disparate labor-management
concerns;" 2 thus, one framework cannot be neatly superimposed on
the other for comparative purposes. Nevertheless, because deregula-
tion has brought the labor-management concerns of RLA industries
conceptually closer to those of NLRA industries" 3 and because
courts interpreting the RLA are borrowing NLRA doctrine, it is
instructive to contrast the dispute resolution obligations under both
statutes.
Management's statutory duty to bargain under both statutes
affords workers the ability to affect decisions that directly concern
their livelihood." I4 Inevitably, that duty often chafes against manage-
ment's freedom to determine how to spend its capital."I5 With respect
to a business' operational changes, labor's relative bargaining position
is determined by the extent to which management's power to effect
those changes is subject to statutory bargaining restraints. Manage-
ment prerogative doctrine tends to favor management by limiting
labor's right to bargain and to make use of its economic strength once
a contract is in place. Thus, an examination of management preroga-
tive doctrine and its impact on the relative power of the parties
110. Id. at 351-52.
111. For a discussion of the social and economic functions of collective bargaining, see D.
BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 222 (1970).
112. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
113. See supra Section II(B).
114. Section 2(First) of the RLA requires parties to "exert every reasonable effort to make
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." RLA
§ 2(First), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First). Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides that management has
a duty to bargain with a union over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment." NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
115. See Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First
National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 402, 403 (1982).
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focuses on the status of the collective bargaining agreement: whether
it is initially being negotiated with the union as the employees' recog-
nized representative, whether it is presently operative, or whether it
has expired.
B. Resolving Disputes During the Formation of an Initial Collective
Bargaining Agreement
When management and labor meet to negotiate a collective bar-
gaining agreement for the first time, the NLRA and RLA both man-
date that the parties' representatives follow collective bargaining
procedures. 1 6 The NLRA requires a much less extensive collective
bargaining process than the RLA, which incorporates collective bar-
gaining within the "major" classification. 7 As interpreted, the
116. RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156; NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
117. RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156. When labor wishes to trigger the major dispute procedure,
it sends a Section 6 notice to management. A party must give a Section 6 notice at least 30
days before an intended change in the agreement. Id. Within 10 days after the notice is
received, the parties must agree to a reasonable place for a conference and convene within the
30 days provided for in the notice. Id. The parties must then confer. RLA § 2(Second), 45
U.S.C. § 152(Second).
If the conference is unsuccessful, either party may request the services of the National
Mediation Board (NMB), or the NMB may offer its services. RLA §§ 5-6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-
156. The NMB is an administrative agency composed of three members appointed by the
President of the United States and approved by the Senate. RLA § 4(First), 45 U.S.C.
§ 154(First). The NMB appoints a staff of mediators, who serve in a capacity similar to
NLRB attorneys and agents. RLA § 4(Third)-(Fourth), 45 U.S.C. § 154(Third)-(Fourth); see
T. KNEEL, LABOR LAW § 50.04[1], at 50-9 (rev. ed. 1984). The length of time for negotiating
and mediating is entirely at the discretion of the NMB. See, e.g., International Ass'n of
Machinists v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lan Chile Airlines v.
National Mediation Bd., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3665 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Seaboard World
Airways v. Local 851, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 501 F. Supp. 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
If the NMB's efforts at mediation fail, it must attempt to "induce [the parties] to submit
their dispute to binding arbitration." RLA § 5(First), 45 U.S.C. § 155(First). Then, if either
party rejects arbitration, the status quo must be maintained for a 30 day cooling-off period
before the parties may resort to self-help remedies. Id. The NMB may notify the President of
the United States if it determines that the dispute threatens to deprive a region of essential
service. RLA § 10, 45 U.S.C. § 160. The President may then create an emergency board to
investigate the dispute. Id. If the President creates a factfinding board to investigate and
report on the dispute, the parties must again maintain the status quo until 30 days after the
emergency board has reported to the President. Id. This additional 30 days allows the board
time to act and subjects the parties to political and social pressures while they "cool off." T.
KHEEL, supra, § 50.05[1], at 50-30. Only one emergency board has been established in the
airline industry since 1976. Curtin, supra note 32, at 187. That board was congressionally
imposed in the Wien Air Alaska and Air Line Pilots Association dispute, which led to the
enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act. Id. at 187 n.6.
If both parties accept arbitration, the NMB sets up a three or six person arbitration board.
RLA § 7(First), 45 U.S.C. § 157(First). The parties and the NMB each name an arbitrator.
RLA § 7(Second), 45 U.S.C. § 157(Second). At this stage, the parties are involved in an
adversarial proceeding for the first time. After each side presents evidence and testimony, the
arbitration board grants an award that is conclusive as to the merits and facts of the dispute
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NLRA provides that parties may use collective bargaining as an
exclusive means of forming and amending agreements;'II mediation,
or the assistance of third parties, is strictly voluntary." 9 In contrast,
the RLA mandates collective bargaining under these circumstances
merely as a procedure of first resort;2 0 if the parties collectively bar-
gain to impasse,'21 they are then assisted by a National Mediation
Board (NMB) mediator and later, if both parties consent, by an arbi-
tration board.' 22
Thus, RLA parties encounter an additional burden before the
employer is free to act consistently with offers placed on the table and
before the union is free to strike; they must bargain to impasse, then
engage in mediation to the NMB's satisfaction. Because of the addi-
tional requirement of mediation and because the NMB may be reluc-
tant to declare an impasse,'23 the RLA's collective bargaining phase
may be substantially longer in duration than that of the NLRA. The
protracted length of the RLA's major dispute procedure and the
unless a party successfully petitions to impeach it. RLA § 9(Second), 45 U.S.C.
§ 159(Second). The petition must be filed in a federal district court within 10 days after the
filing of the award. Id. The award should be construed liberally by the court. RLA
§ 9(Third), 45 U.S.C. § 159(Third).
118. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
119. Beyond the fact that mediation is statutory under the RLA and voluntary under the
NLRA, there are further differences in the two procedures. Under the NLRA's voluntary
mediation, the mediator has no power to compel agreement, and the parties can virtually
ignore him. Krislov, Mediation Under the Railway Labor Act. A Process in Search of a Name,
27 LAB. L.J. 310 (1976). The RLA's mediation procedure, "quasi-judicial" in nature, requires
that the NMB determine when the parties' efforts have been "satisfactory." Id. at 311. Delay
is a tactic used more in RLA mediations than in voluntary mediation sessions, and the NMB
has used the process to wear down parties. Id. at 312. It is possible for the RLA's process to
last for years. Id. at 311-12.
120. RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156; see supra note 117.
121. Impasse is the point at which negotiations are deadlocked. According to the NLRB:
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The bargaining
history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is
disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state
of negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an
impasse in bargaining existed.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967).
122. See supra note 117. Both mediation and arbitration use the assistance of third parties.
Mediation primarily differs from arbitration in the sense that it is strictly conciliatory; it is not
binding on the parties. See Hart, Techniques of Collective Bargaining, 26 PRAC. LAW. 9
(1980). Mediators are government officials who work for the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service or for a similar state or local agency. Id. Although mediation is strictly
voluntary in most NLRA industries, the RLA mandates its use if the parties bargain to
impasse while negotiating agreements or their amendments. RLA §§ 5-6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-
156. For a discussion of the circumstances in which mediation is mandated under the RLA,
see supra note 119.
123. See supra note 119.
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NMB's sole power to determine the point of deadlock have enormous
economic consequences.1 24
The force of the RLA's time factor results from the statutory
imposition of the status quo. Both the RLA and the NLRA attempt
to equalize the bargaining positions of the parties during the collective
bargaining process by mandating maintenance of the status quo. Pur-
suant to that mandate, management may not effectuate changes and
labor may not strike while bargaining.12 This requirement recognizes
that the consequences of economic action are potentially severe for
both parties. If management unilaterally implements a change in
operations, labor loses an opportunity to protect its livelihood
through influencing the decisionmaking process. 126 If labor strikes,
striking employees may lose income or be replaced, and management
may be unable to maintain service .or production. 27  Under the
NLRA, the possibility of a short status quo period and imminent eco-
nomic action is greater than under the RLA's major dispute proce-
dure. Thus, for NLRA parties, the threat of immediate economic
force is the predominant factor forcing an agreement between the
parties. 128
Within the collective bargaining framework, the availability of
124. See T. KNEEL, supra note 117, § 50.05[1], at 50-27.
125. Under the RLA, both parties must maintain the status quo from the filing of a Section
6 notice through the 30 day post-impasse period or, if an emergency board is appointed, during
the 30 days after it reports to the President. RLA § 5(First), 45 U.S.C. § 155(First). The
requirement prevents union strikes as well as management actions, and it is presumably
designed as a final effort at rational resolution before a disruption of commerce might occur.
See, e.g., Railway Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966) ("[The process is]
purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will
provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute."). The United States Supreme Court
has held that a carrier's obligation to maintain the status quo applies not only to the terms of
the agreement, but also to a broad concept of the working conditions and practices that gave
rise to the dispute. Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v. United Trailsp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 153
(1969).
The NLRA similarly requires maintenance of the status quo during collective bargaining.
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979). In the NLRA context,
the status quo requirement has been restricted to mandatory topics contained in an agreement.
Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984) (Milwaukee
Spring H); see infra notes 346-53 and accompanying text.
126. See Kohler, supra note 115, at 413.
127. See J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 19-43
(1983).
128. See id. at 120. Under the NLRA, if all the requirements of Section 8(d) have been met,
labor is free to strike not only at impasse but also at the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Section 8(d) provides that "no party to [the]
contract shall terminate or modify [it], unless the party desiring [the] termination or
modification... (4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out,
all the terms and conditions of the existing contract ... until its expiration date." Id. The
employer, however, cannot act unilaterally prior to impasse.
19891
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
economic weaponry hinges on the designation of topics and their
inclusion or exclusion from the collective bargaining agreement. At
an initial level of analysis, labor's power lies in the breadth of topics
over which management must bargain and in the extent of manage-
ment's bargaining obligation.'2 9 Under the NLRA, Subsections
8(a)(5) and 8(d) 3° define mandatory topics of bargaining as "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment.""'3 Congress
left the exact definitional boundaries of mandatory topics for the
determination of the NLRB and the courts.' 32 In recent years, those
tribunals have substantially narrowed the topics over which manage-
ment must bargain, and allowed it more freedom from statutory con-
straints. 133 In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg- Warner Corp.,' 34 the
United States Supreme Court determined that NLRA Subsections
8(a)(5) and 8(d) require bargaining to impasse1 35 over "mandatory"
subjects.' 36 Bargaining over permissive subjects, however, is strictly
at the election of the parties, who may not insist on bargaining to
impasse over them.1 37
Because management is required to maintain the status quo until
it bargains to impasse over mandatory topics, the mandatory-permis-
sive distinction creates the foundation for bargaining over topics in an
initial agreement. As an illustration, parties must bargain in good
faith until they reach an impasse over a topic, such as wages, that
clearly falls within the ambit of the statute.' 38 Conversely, although
the boundaries of the mandatory-permissive distinction are impre-
cise, 131 one might imagine that if labor desired to discuss the purchase
of a replacement computer system with management,"'4 the permis-
129. Lynch, supra note 36, at 271-312.
130. NLRA § 8(a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d).
131. Id.
132. See Kohler, supra note 115, at 403.
133. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Milwaukee Spring
Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring H).
134. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
135. For a definition of impasse, see supra note 121.
136. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. The status quo was further limited when the NLRB
held that if management seeks to modify a mandatory term contained in a collective
bargaining agreement, it must first obtain the union's consent. Milwaukee Spring II, 268
N.L.R.B. at 602. If the mandatory term is not contained in the agreement, however,
management need not obtain the union's consent, but it must bargain in good faith to impasse
before implementing the change. Id.
137. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602.
138. See UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
139. See J. ATLESON, supra note 127, at 120-21; Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-
Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV.
1447, 1454 (1982).
140. For the purpose of illustration, assume that the purchase would not eliminate jobs and
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sive nature of the topic would inhibit labor's demands. It would not
be incumbent on management to discuss the topic, and management
could purchase any computer system it chose.
Theoretically, therefore, the designation of a topic as permissive
allows NLRA employers to take unilateral action without bargaining
and without fear of economic pressure.14' When several items are on
the bargaining table, however, as is the case during the formation of
an initial collective agreement, a party may concede on a mandatory
issue in order to obtain agreement on a permissive one.'42 To illus-
trate, if the parties are bargaining concurrently over wages and the
computer system, labor might consent to a wage concession in order
to influence the decision regarding the selection of a computer system.
In conjunction with the topical classification during the negotia-
tion of an initial agreement, the availability of economic weapons
determines the parties' relative power. The parties are not yet bound
by a collective agreement and thus are not contractually prevented
from exercising economic force. Labor may strike prior to impasse if
all the requirements of Section 8(d) of the NLRA have been met. 43
At impasse, management may act unilaterally. '" The likelihood that
management's acts may cause a strong union to retaliate maximizes
the union's leverage during the bargaining ielationship. If the union
is powerful and a strike would be devastating to management, the
reality of labor's economic strength would affect its presentation of
the overall package of topics-as well as management's receptive-
ness-and overshadow the mandatory-permissive distinction."'
Thus, a strong union may convince management to allow it a voice in
a decision concerning the purchase of a computer system, notwith-
standing the fact that the topic is permissive.
The RLA similarly requires parties to bargain over any changes
in "rates of pay, rules and working conditions."' 4 6 Aside from the
topical similarity, however, the two statutes establish their collective
bargaining mechanisms very differently. The RLA was developed as
a framework for dispute resolution in an industry that was not only
crucial to commerce, but was also pervaded with a strong labor pres-
ence. Congress sought to balance these economic concerns by
that the issue arises in isolation; such a situation, however, would not occur during bargaining
over an initial agreement.
141. Kohler, supra note 115, at 405.
142. J. ATLESON, supra note 127, at 120.
143. For a description of Section 8(d), see supra note 128.
144. Id.
145. J. ATLESON, supra note 127, at 111-35.
146. RLA § 2(First), (Sixth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First), (Sixth).
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extending the period over which parties could work out their differ-
ences by themselves.'47 Thus, the RLA requires parties to bargain in
good faith to impasse, and then mediate to impasse, over all legitimate
bargaining topics. 41
After the deregulation of the airline industry, the major dispute
procedure frequently has been too rigid to accommodate the altered
concerns of the parties. The time element embodied in the mediation
requirement profoundly affects the bargaining relationship. Either
the parties or the mediator may stall the process, waiting for events
that might change the outcome. 149
Because of the potential length of the process, the parties' bar-
gaining positions during the pre-agreement stage of bargaining are
predetermined to favor the party least desirous of the new terms. It is
axiomatic that when a union organizes within a company, it does so
because employees are unhappy with their present wages, benefits, or
working conditions. When RLA parties are negotiating an initial
agreement, labor may concede some of its demands in order to hasten
the implementation of higher wages or better working conditions. It
follows that the RLA's major dispute classification, when used during
the formation of an initial collective agreement, may add to manage-
ment's bargaining power. Thus, the length of the RLA's major dis-
pute procedure functions like the economic threat in the NLRA
context by encouraging compromise. 5 ° Under the RLA, however,
instead of the economically weaker party yielding to the stronger, the
time factor may more subtly sway the party desiring the change to
make concessions, notwithstanding the parties' economic strength.
147. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
148. In 1945, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the RLA's designation of bargaining
topics by delineating the difference between grievance disputes and disputes over the formation
of collective agreements. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722 (1945). The Court
termed controversies over the formation of agreements "major" and held that they are
disagreements that arise When there is no collective bargaining agreement or when the parties
seek to change the terms of an existing agreement. Id. at 723. Thus, the parties are disputing
the acquisition of future rights, not the determination of vested rights. Id.
The Court went on to hold that "minor" disputes are arbitrable disputes concerning
accrued rights, not the creation of new ones. Id. These disputes may arise from either the
interpretation of provisions in existing agreements or from an event independent of the
agreement. Id. In the latter category, the Court included situations that are omitted from a
collective bargaining agreement as well as claims that are not contained in the agreement. Id.
149. T. KHEEL, supra note 117, § 50.05[1], at 50-27 to -28; Krislov, supra note 119, at 311.
150. Krislov, supra note 119, at 313 (citing Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp.
Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148-50 (1969)).
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C. Resolving Disputes During the Term of an Agreement
1. MID-TERM COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
It is during mid-term bargaining that the NLRA's mandatory
and permissive subjects exhibit their clearest distinction. 5 ' When a
party presents a single issue for discussion during the term of an
agreement, no other issues generally cloud its consideration."' Thus,
labor may wish to discuss a permissive topic, such as which computer
system to purchase, but it may not insist that management bargain
over the topic or that management refrain from making its deci-
sion. 53 Conversely, management's desire to lower wages would con-
stitute an action concerning a mandatory topic. As a result of the
mandatory designation, management is statutorily obligated to bar-
gain over the topic and to refrain from unilaterally modifying the con-
tract pending bargaining. If, for purposes of discussion, wages were
not contained in the existing agreement, management must first pres-
ent the issue to labor, and labor may insist on bargaining to impasse
over the issue before management can implement the reduction.
1 54
Although labor may then assert a statutory violation based on man-
agement's failure to bargain over a mandatory topic, labor's freedom
to retaliate with a strike may be thwarted by management's claim that
the collective agreement grants management the right to act. In that
event, if the employer is willing to arbitrate, the NLRB will defer the
dispute to arbitration, and an injunction may issue to enforce the no-
strike clause.' 55 Absent a rare status quo injunction, 56 management
may lower wages pending arbitration pursuant to the "obey and
grieve" doctrine. 15 7 Labor's recourse against management's unilateral
151. See J. ATLESON, supra note 127, at 120.
152. It is possible, however, for the economic power of the parties to be a factor. See supra
notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
153. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
154. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring H). If the collective bargaining agreement contained a management rights
clause that permitted the employer to control wages, the topic of wages would be "contained
in" the agreement within the meaning of Section 8(d), and it would be subject to arbitration.
See infra notes 168 & 346-53 and accompanying text.
155. The Supreme Court has held that, under the NLRA, an express or implied no-strike
clause is the quid pro quo for an employer's agreement to arbitrate disputes. See Boys Mkts.,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247-48 (1970); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); see also Lynch, supra note 36, at 294-95. For a discussion of
the NLRA's arbitration procedure, see infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
156. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 294-95.
157. For a discussion of the "work first, grieve later" principle, see Lynch, supra note 36, at
294 n.303.
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action is limited to arbitrating for a contractual remedy.' If, how-
ever, labor has succeeded in including wages or any other mandatory
topic in an agreement, management must not only convince labor to
bargain over the proposed change, but must also obtain labor's con-
sent before taking any action. 5 9 Management is statutorily and con-
tractually compelled to obtain that consent.' 60
Management can avoid bargaining and the corresponding threat
of economic force if it can persuade labor to contractually waive
labor's statutory right to bargain under specified circumstances.' 61
Such a waiver effectively places potential collective bargaining topics
into an arbitration framework and thus reduces the threat of
strikes. 162  For example, management may substantially increase its
freedom to make business decisions by persuading labor to incorpo-
rate "reserved rights" or "management rights" clauses in an agree-
ment. Under those clauses, management may unilaterally effectuate
any operational changes not explicitly prohibited by the agreement,
without submitting the issues to labor. 63  Conversely, under the
NLRA, labor may seek "zipper" clauses that close out bargaining
during the contract term. These zipper clauses effectively prevent
management from changing the status quo with regard to mandatory
topics unless labor's consent is obtained or unless the change is
authorized by the agreement. 64 The RLA's functional equivalent of
zipper clauses are moratorium clauses, which prevent the filing of Sec-
158. The union will claim in arbitration that management's action was prohibited by the
collective bargaining agreement.
159. See UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
160. Thus, labor's best recourse is to bargain to incorporate the items into the agreement.
It is then assured of at least a contractual remedy if management unilaterally makes a change
that violates the agreement's terms. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. I v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20, 187-88 (1971). If the topic is permissive
and is incorporated into an agreement, labor has a contractual, not a statutory, remedy. Id.
Section 301 of the LMRA provides a federal remedy for breach of contract actions. Id at 181
n.20 (interpreting LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185). Conversely, if labor succeeds in
incorporating a mandatory topic into an agreement and if management acts without labor's
consent, labor has the additional statutory remedy of an unfair labor practice charge under
Section 8(d) of the NLRA. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984). For a
discussion and excerpt of NLRA § 8(d), see supra note 128. Management can also contract
around mandatory topics through management rights clauses. See infra notes 161-70 and
accompanying text.
161. See Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible
Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985).
162. See id. at 30; see also UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
163. See Hart, supra note 122, at 25.
164. UAW, 765 F.2d at 180. Additionally, work preservation clauses prevent management
from making job-related changes without labor's consent. See Edwards, supra note 161, at 32-
33.
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tion 6 notices during the term of the agreement. 165 Even when con-
tracts contain such clauses, disputes arise over whether a proposed
action fits within those actions permitted by the contract, thereby
comprising a minor dispute. 66
In summary, if a dispute over a single subject occurs during the
term of an agreement, the topical distinction may operate either to
protect labor's right to bargain or consent or to protect management's
right to respond to product market changes. 67 A mandatory designa-
tion grants labor either the right to be heard in a bargaining forum
before management acts 61 or, pursuant to a zipper clause, the poten-
tial right to prevent management's action completely. 69 If, however,
a topic is designated as permissive, management has more freedom to
take unilateral action. An employer need not bargain over a permis-
sive topic that is not contained in an agreement. 70
2. MID-TERM ARBITRATION
Under both the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor
Relations Act, parties draw from statutory language to contractually
provide for binding arbitration, a grievance-oriented procedure. 71
165. Moratorium clauses close out Section 6 bargaining during the term of an agreement.
An example of a moratorium clause is one that provides in part: "'This entire agreement shall
continue in full force and effect through December 31, 1987, and thereafter shall be subject to
change as provided for in Section 6 . . . of the Railway Labor Act, as amended.'"
International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Eastern Airlines, 849 F.2d 1481, 1482 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (quoting from labor agreement).
166. See Section IV(A) (discussing Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869
F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Pilots II)).
167. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 280-83.
168. If the mandatory topic is not contained in an agreement, management may act after
bargaining to impasse. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 281.
169. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
170. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring II). Conversely, management may retain the power to act unilaterally by
excluding permissive topics from arbitration, either through a specific reference to the topic or
through a general reference in a management rights clause. See supra notes 161-70 and
accompanying text.
171. Although the starting points for enforcement of arbitration under the statutes were
poles apart, courts have borrowed doctrine until the end results are now largely
interchangeable. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 663, 676 (1973).
Minor disputes arising in the railroad industry are subject to compulsory, binding
arbitration before either the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) or a board
established by management and labor. RLA § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153. The airlines' minor
disputes under the RLA are submitted to arbitration panels called System Boards of
Adjustment (system boards), which operate on a carrier-wide basis. RLA § 3, 45 U.S.C.
§ 153; RLA § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184; T. KNEEL, supra note 117, § 50.06[2], at 50-39. The
system board's jurisdiction over a minor dispute is exclusive, and its result is binding. RLA
§ 4(Fourth), 45 U.S.C. § 154(Fourth). The boards are usually composed of an equal number
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Under the NLRA, labor will typically accept the quid pro quo of a
no-strike clause in return for management's agreement to arbitrate
grievances. 172 Additionally, the NLRB and the courts interpreting
the NLRA have adopted a policy of deferral to arbitration; as a result,
arbitration has become known as the cornerstone of the NLRA. 173
Although arbitration was a judicial gloss on the NLRA, it was
mandated by the RLA at its inception.1 74 Whereas disputes concern-
ing the negotiation of new agreements or the amendment of existing
agreements constitute major disputes subject to collective bargain-
ing, 75 those concerning the interpretation of existing agreements are
minor disputes subject to binding arbitration.1 76 For example, a dis-
of management and labor members. RLA § 3(First)(a), 45 U.S.C. § 153(First)(a). If the
board deadlocks, a neutral referee is appointed to break the tie. RLA § 153(First)(1), 45
U.S.C. § 153(First)(1). During the pendency of a minor dispute and absent a status quo
injunction, management is allowed to implement its interpretation of the agreement. See
Maine Cent. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 787 F.2d 780, 781 (lst Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 848 (1986); Local 553, Transp. Workers Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 695 F.2d 668, 675
(2d Cir. 1983); United Transp. Union v. Penn Cent. Transp., 505 F.2d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 1974).
In comparison, the 1935 version of the NLRA did not consider the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935); Feller, supra, at 687. Congress
amended the NLRA in 1947, ch. 120, tit. 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), although the result was unlike
the RLA's minor dispute procedure. Feller, supra, at 689. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the Wagner Act states: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties .. " LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Thus, unlike the RLA,
the NLRA did not establish or require the parties to establish an arbitration mechanism for
disputes over the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. See Feller, supra, at 687-
90. The Supreme Court held that Section 301 mandated the federal courts to create a federal
substantive law of collective bargaining. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 456 (1957). The Lincoln Mills Court held that congressional intent indicated that "the
agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."
Id. at 453-54.
RLA tribunals began to borrow NLRA doctrine to fill an omission in the RLA's minor
dispute procedure. Feller, supra, at 692. When Congress extended the RLA to the airlines, it
neglected to provide for judicial enforcement of arbitration board decisions. Id. at 692-93.
The Supreme Court filled the gap in International Association of Machinists v. Central
Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, reh'g denied, 373 U.S. 947 (1963), holding that labor agreements and
arbitration boards should be governed by federal law.
Thus, the general arbitration requirements of the two statutes merged: Lincoln Mills
proceeded from jurisdiction to substance, while Central Airlines proceeded from substance to
jurisdiction. Feller, supra, at 693.
172. See Feller, supra note 171, at 757.
173. The United States Supreme Court established grievance arbitration as the basis of
NLRA bargaining in three cases collectively known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
174. See supra note 171.
175. For a discussion of the major dispute procedure, see supra note 117.
176. For a discussion of the minor dispute procedure, see supra note 171.
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pute over accrued rights, such as insurance benefits, would constitute
a minor dispute.177 The problem over classification of a dispute arises
when a managerial action can be viewed either as permissible under
an expansive interpretation of an agreement, thereby constituting a
minor dispute, or as an attempt to amend an agreement, thereby trig-
gering a major dispute.
D. Resolving Disputes After an Agreement Has Expired
After an agreement has expired, negotiations over new collective
agreements follow collective bargaining frameworks under both the
NLRA and RLA.178 During this stage of the agreement, however,
the effects of deregulation have a crucial bearing on a determination
of the parties' relative bargaining positions under the RLA.
In NLRA industries, which are primarily unregulated, the bal-
ance of power during the post-expiration phase is closely related to
the parties' potential use of economic force. In this sense, post-expira-
tion collective bargaining in NLRA industries is often similar to the
bargaining which takes place during the formation of an initial agree-
ment. In the post-expiration time frame, the mandatory-permissive
distinction may have less bearing on the relative power of the parties
than during the term of the agreement because the bargaining is influ-
enced by the weight of the total bargaining package, as well as by the
availability of economic force if impasse is reached over a group of
topics that includes a mandatory topic.179
In the RLA context, the effects of deregulation, coupled with the
protracted major dispute procedure, produce different concerns.
When the airline industry was regulated, government control virtually
guaranteed collective bargaining agreements that were more desirable
than previous ones. 180 Moreover, carriers were often permitted to off-
set the higher contractual wages with higher fares.181 During regula-
tion, therefore, the extensive major dispute procedure worked for the
benefit of management by allowing management to prolong the pro-
cess; labor typically would make concessions in order to more quickly
implement the desirable agreement. Deregulation, however, brought
concession bargaining to the airline industry. In today's marketplace,
the relative bargaining positions of management and labor are
reversed, with management now having the most to gain by having a
177. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 646 F.2d 230, 231 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1981).
178. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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new agreement in place. As a consequence, the benefits that result
from prolonging the bargaining process have shifted to labor, which
may now use the time element to force concessions from
management.
Thus, the doctrinal frameworks of the NLRA and the RLA
impact differently on the rights and relative negotiating power of the
parties. Courts' varying interpretations of the RLA during the mid-
term and post-expiration phases of collective agreements, however, do
not always consider the implications of applying NLRA policy to the
RLA. This confusion is illustrated in three disputes that arose at
Eastern Air Lines.
IV. EASTERN AIR LINES
The tumultuous relationship'82 between management and labor
182. In recent years, Eastern attempted to implement many operational changes, and its
unions filed suit to block them. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air
Lines, 849 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (spin-off of fleet service employees); International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, 826 F.2d 1141 (1st Cir. 1987) (layoffs); Local 553,
Transport Workers Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 695 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1983) (route purchases);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, 320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963) (work
vacations and wage reductions); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 683 F. Supp.
845 (D.D.C. 1988) (subcontracting of pilots for training flights); Eastern Air Lines v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 670 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (sale of airline to Texas Air); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3491 (D.D.C. July 2, 1987)
(transferring employees without notice).
The disputes did not prevent the loss of jobs, nor did they prevent the airline from
growing financially weaker. At the time of Eastern Furlough II, Eastern employed 12,500
fewer people than it employed two years previously; the work force had shrunk by 40%.
Lyons & Merzer, As Eastern is Slowly Dismantled, So Are Lives, Miami Herald, Nov. 13, 1988,
at A18, col. 1. Meanwhile, Eastern was losing $100 million per quarter. Lyons, Lorenzo
Texas Air Chief Offers Last Hope to Eastern, Miami Herald, Oct. 30, 1988, at Fl, col. 2.
Eastern maintained that until its unions agreed to major wage concessions, it would be
forced to continue selling assets. Id. at col. 5. Frank Lorenzo, chairman of Texas Air Corp.,
the holding company for Eastern, stated that his goal was to achieve at least $790 million in
wage cuts and work-rule changes over three years. Lyons, No One Can Arrive at a Deal That
Would Satisfy Everyone, Miami Herald, Nov. 13, 1988, at A18, col. 1. As of the second
quarter of 1988, Eastern had borrowed more than $2.53 billion and was spending $544 million
annually to service the debt. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 893
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Eastern Furlough II), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
The unions contended that Eastern was interested only in short-term profits, not in long-
term viability. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 703 F. Supp. 962, 966 (D.D.C.
1988) (Eastern Furlough I), rev'd and remanded, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Eastern
Furlough II). They claimed that Eastern was "cannibalizing itself" for the benefit of
Continental Air Lines, a predominantly non-unionized carrier also owned by Texas Air Corp.
Lyons & Merzer, supra, at A 18, col. 4. The unions also contended that poor management was
responsible for the carrier's financial condition, and they claimed that they would not stop
fighting until they owned the airline. Lyons, Court OKs Job Cutbacks at Eastern, Miami
Herald, Oct. 1, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
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at Eastern Air Lines has provided three recent conflicts, addressed by
the federal courts of the District of Columbia, that vividly illustrate
the difficulty of applying the Railway Labor Act's major-minor classi-
fication to disputes in the deregulated airline industry. The discussion
that follows explores the manner in which these courts attempted to
classify conflicts that arose during the operation of collective bargain-
ing agreements and after their expiration.
A. Eastern Pilots II: Mid-Term Dispute Classification
Air Line Pilots Association International v. Eastern Air Lines
(Eastern Pilots 1)183 involved a dispute that occurred during the term
of a collective bargaining agreement between the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA) and Eastern Air Lines. The dispute arose when
Eastern's management contracted with Orion Lift Services (Orion) to
provide pilots to Eastern in the event of a pilots' strike.8 4 Eastern
entered into a contract for Orion's pilot replacement service because it
feared that a potential strike by the Eastern machinists union would
be supported by an ALPA sympathy strike. 85 ALPA filed a com-
plaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. 86 The union contended
that the use of non-Eastern pilots in preparation for a sympathy strike
was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and thus consti-
tuted a major dispute.' 87 Claiming that the agreement allowed it to
build up a reserve of pilots and that the dispute was therefore minor,
Eastern moved to dismiss.188
The relevant clauses in the agreement were a moratorium clause,
which provided that the agreement was neither amendable nor subject
to renegotiation until its expiration,' 89 and a scope clause, which pro-
vided that "all present or future flying, including flight training"
would be performed by Eastern pilots.'9 ° Of the two clauses, the dis-
183. 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
184. Id. at 1519.
185. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 683 F. Supp. 845, 848 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Eastern Pilots I), rev'd, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Pilots H).
186. Id. at 846.
187. Id. The major dispute procedure is the RLA's forum for constructing and amending
collective agreements. It consists primarily of collective bargaining and mediation.
188. Eastern Pilots 1, 683 F. Supp. at 846. The minor dispute resolution procedure is the
RLA's forum for arbitrating disputes over interpretations of collective bargaining agreements.
189. Id. at 847. For a discussion of moratorium clauses, see supra notes 161-66 and
accompanying text.
190. Eastern Pilots I, 683 F. Supp. at 847. The scope clause provided:
It is agreed that all present or future flying, including flight training (except for
initial factory-conducted training in newly purchased equipment), revenue flying,
ferry flights, charters and wet-leases performed in or for the service of Eastern
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trict court examined only the scope clause; it held that the dispute
was major because the training constituted a unilateral repudiation of
the agreement that was not justified by past practices.' 9 The court
supported its conclusion that contract repudiation comprises a major
dispute by referencing cases that held that a "change" or "violation"
of a collective bargaining agreement would trigger the major
classification. 192
Although the conclusion that contract repudiation constitutes a
major dispute was well supported, the district court did not address
the inherent conflict between this conclusion and the existing morato-
rium clause. If a change or repudiation of a collective bargaining
agreement constitutes a major dispute, then major disputes cannot
arise without the other parties' consent during the term of an agree-
ment that contains a moratorium clause, which would preclude
changes to the agreement during its term. The parties would have
waived their right to amend the agreement through the moratorium
clause; presumably, the moratorium clause should have precluded
bargaining by foreclosing changes or amendments until the agree-
ment's expiration date.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed. 93  In an opinion written by Judge
Edwards, the court of appeals not only redefined the standard of repu-
diation, but also held that contract repudiation alone is insufficient to
qualify a mid-term dispute as major. 94 Disagreeing with the rule fol-
lowed in other circuits that major disputes may be based on violations
Air Lines, Inc., shall be performed by pilots whose names appear on the then-
current Eastern Air Lines' System Seniority List.
Id.
191. Id. at 852.
192. Id. at 851-52 (citing Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945)). The court
also referenced Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969)
(unilateral repudiation is a major dispute); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v.
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 827 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1987) (formal change in an
agreement is a major dispute); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen,
665 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982) (violation of a collective
bargaining agreement is a major dispute); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Washington
Terminal Co., 473 F.2d 1156, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Switchmen's Union v.
Southern Pac. Co., 398 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1968)) (a change that "is in nowise
contemplated or arguably covered by the agreement" is a major dispute); United Indus.
Workers v. Board of Trustees, 351 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1965) (violation of collective
bargaining agreement is a major dispute); Local 553, Transport Workers Union v. Eastern Air
Lines, 544 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd as modified, 695 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1982) (violation
of collective bargaining agreement is major dispute).
193. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots H).
194. Id. at 1522-23.
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of collective bargaining agreements, Judge Edwards wrote that a
repudiation is more than just a clear violation of an agreement. 95
Instead, a major dispute must arise from a repudiation that is so
severe that it amounts to bad faith:
That is, even if the court is absolutely convinced that the agree-
ment prohibits the party's action, it may not infer that the party
has repudiated the agreement, thus generating a major dispute,
unless the court makes the "essential finding" that the party's prof-
fered interpretation is "so inherently unreasonable as to amount to
bad faith." To hold otherwise would allow the court to find a
major dispute based solely on its view of the merits-usurping the
role of the arbitrator in interpreting and applying the contract. 196
Because the court's view of mid-term major disputes was so
restrictive, its view of minor disputes was correspondingly expansive.
Building on the NLRA policy of deferral to arbitration' 97 and adding
to the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that mid-term disputes are minor
unless a party's claims are frivolously based on an agreement,' 98 the
District of Columbia Circuit determined that if a dispute can be
resolved by reference to an agreement, then the dispute is minor even
if the claim of contractual justification is frivolous. '99
The District of Columbia Circuit's conceptualization of the pre-
sumption of arbitrability for mid-term disputes under the RLA
reaches beyond the Supreme Court's later holding that arbitration is
the proper forum for settling disputes that are arguably grounded in
contractual interpretation. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association,2° the Supreme Court held that past
practices constituted an implied contract term that arguably permit-
ted a railroad employer to implement drug screening as part of its
required medical examinations.2"' The Court therefore molded a
somewhat narrower version of mid-term minor disputes than the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, holding in effect that frivolous contractual
justifications constitute major disputes. Although the distinction may
seem slight, a close case such as Eastern Pilots might produce a differ-
ent result under each perspective. In Eastern Pilots I, the collective
bargaining agreement prohibited Eastern from using pilots who were
195. Id. at 1523.
196. Id. (citing Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 384 F.2d 323 (D.C.
Cir. 1967)).
197. For a discussion of NLRA deferral policy, see infra notes 385-87 and accompanying
text.
198. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's rule, see infra note 390.
199. Eastern Pilots 1H, 869 F.2d at 1522.
200. 109 U.S. 2477 (1989).
201. Id. at 2489.
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not on its seniority roster to conduct "training flights ... in or for the
service of Eastern."2 °2 Therefore, applying the Supreme Court's stan-
dard, Eastern's claim that the collective bargaining agreement permit-
ted its contract with Orion might not be legitimately arguable
(consistent with the district court's conclusion that the dispute was
major), but it might be frivolous although not brought in bad faith
(consistent with the court of appeals' definition of a minor dispute).20 3
Judge Edwards relied on NLRA policy to support his heavy pre-
sumption of arbitrability, noting that the policy favoring arbitration is
crucial because a collective agreement may include the "common
law" of the parties and of the industry, as well as explicit contractual
terms. 2° 4 He also noted that the question of an industry's "common
law" is uniquely within the province of an arbitrator.20 5 The Consoli-
dated Court referred to the same NLRA policy in arriving at its defi-
nition of minor disputes.2 6
Although the court of appeals' view is grounded in well-settled
NLRA policy, its vision of arbitration is similar to that contemplated
by one of the NLRA's most expansive interpretations of arbitration,
UAW v. NLRB.207 In UAW, an opinion also written by Judge
Edwards, the District of Columbia Circuit implied that an unfair
labor practice charge under Section 8(d)2°8 was a question for the
arbitrator if the parties' agreement contained an arbitration clause, a
no-strike clause, and a zipper clause. 20 9 Eastern Pilots differs from
UAW by not explicitly requiring the contractual inclusion of a mora-
202. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 683 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Eastern Pilots I).
203. Eastern Pilots I, 869 F.2d at 1523. A possible reason for the Supreme Court's and the
District of Columbia Circuit's different constructions of minor disputes is the dissimilarity of
issues before each court. The District of Columbia Circuit's definition of minor disputes
related to an issue that was more entrepreneurial in nature than drug testing, an issue that
implicated privacy concerns.
204. Id. at 1522 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 579 (1960)).
205. Id. (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581).
206. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2484
(1989).
207. 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For a discussion of UAW, see infra notes 350-53 and
accompanying text.
208. Section 8(d) prohibits unilateral modifications of terms "contained in" a collective
bargaining agreement. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). For a further discussion of Section
8(d), see supra notes 128-37 and infra notes 346-53 and accompanying text.
209. UAW, 765 F.2d at 182 n.26. Zipper clauses effectively incorporate into an agreement
all bargaining topics that might arise during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. See
id. at 180. For a discussion of zipper clauses, see supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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torium clause,21 ° the RLA's equivalent of a zipper clause, in order for
an agreement to mandate arbitration during the term of an agree-
ment.2 1' Thus, the Eastern Pilots H court effectively incorporated a
moratorium clause into collective bargaining agreements. Although
most airline collective agreements contain moratorium clauses, the
court's move provides management with more power in bargaining
over new agreements because the clause is presumptively included.
Thus, management may close out bargaining during the term of a
contract unless labor contracts to retain the right to bargain. Typi-
cally, the right to instigate mid-term bargaining under the RLA is to
labor's advantage because such bargaining occurs as a reaction to uni-
lateral managerial actions that management contends are allowed
under the contract. If issues are placed in the bargaining context
rather than in arbitration, labor can impose maintenance of the status
quo throughout the lengthy major dispute process and thereby thwart
management's unilateral action.212 The Eastern Pilots H presumption
of arbitrability, however, would not permit labor to take advantage of
the RLA's prolonged bargaining procedure during virtually all mid-
term disputes.
Because of the similarites between the NLRA and the RLA,
when a mid-term dispute arises over management's unilateral action,
the Eastern Pilots H version of arbitration under the RLA should
raise implications similar to those of the NLRA waiver doctrine. In
the NLRA context, when the issue is whether a managerial action
was properly taken, the statutory issue of whether the employer has
breached its statutory duty to bargain over the action2"3 was often
subordinated to the question of whether the parties contractually
waived their statutory rights.2"4 Waiving of the statutory duty
impacts on the nature of the process and the remedies available in
210. Moratorium clauses close out Section 6 bargaining during the term of a collective
agreement.
211. Although the district court noted an apparent moratorium clause in the ALPA-
Eastern collective bargaining agreement, the court of appeals did not refer to it. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 683 F. Supp. 845, 847 (D.D.C. 1988) (Eastern Pilots I).
To complete the comparison, arbitration under the RLA is statutorily mandated, and a no-
strike clause is judicially imposed. See supra note 171.
212. For a description of relative bargaining power during mid-term application of the
major dispute procedure, see supra Section III(C)(1) and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the status quo, see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
213. The statutory issue may arise from Section 8(a)(5), which provides that refusal to
bargain is an unfair labor practice, and Section 8(d), which prohibits unilateral modifications
of terms "contained in" a collective bargaining agreement. NLRA § 8(a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5), (d). For a further discussion of these subsections, see supra notes 129-37 and infra
notes 346-53 and accompanying text.
214. See Edwards, supra note 161, at 34.
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arbitration. Labor's statutory entitlements are diluted in the arbitra-
tion forum, and labor is often limited to compensation awards because
employers are free to act pending arbitration.21 5
Similarly, the issue under the RLA is whether the dispute over
management's mid-term unilateral action is subject to resolution
through bargaining or through arbitration. As under the NLRA, the
RLA's arbitration forum permits management to act pending arbitra-
tion unless injunctive relief, which typically has not been granted, is
obtained.216 Judge Edwards has noted that injunctive relief is avail-
able to prohibit management's actions "only when an injunction is
necessary to preserve the arbitrator's ability to decide the dispute. '21 7
Because ALPA did not ask for injunctive relief in Eastern Pilots II,
however, the court did not further define the availability of its equita-
ble powers in the minor dispute setting.218
215. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 294-95; infra notes 418-19 and accompanying text.
216. Some courts have attempted to equalize the relative power positions of the parties who
are resolving disputes within the minor classification by ordering equitable relief. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a district court has the authority to enjoin strikes in
furtherance of the RLA's mandate to preserve the adjustment board's jurisdiction.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1960); see also National Ry. Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 830 F.2d
741, 750-52 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[E]ffecting further contacts like the [ones at hand] may well
make pragmatically impossible any truly complete remedial order of the adjustment board
decisions should they favor the unions' position ...."); Local 554, Transp. Workers Union v.
Eastern Air Lines, 695 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir. 1982) (A status quo injunction is available if it is
necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming meaningless.); cf Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 845 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1988) (P&LEI) (same), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE H). In doing so, some courts "weigh the competing interests."
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d 549, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1972).
More often than not, however, courts have refused to use their equitable powers to
prevent management from acting where a minor dispute is pending. In Chicago &
Northwestern Transportation Co. v. Railway Labor Executives Association, for example, the
Seventh Circuit ordered injunctive relief to prevent a union from striking over a sale of assets,
reasoning that the action was necessary to maintain the adjustment board's jurisdiction over
minor disputes. 855 F.2d 1277, 1287 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 493 (1988) (citing
National Ry. Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 830 F.2d 741, 749 (7th
Cir. 1987)); see also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 363
U.S. 528, 531 (1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S.
30, 40-42 (1957); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 704
(7th Cir. 1987). In Chicago & Northwestern, however, the Seventh Circuit did not find it
necessary to order the carrier to suspend the sale; it concluded that there would be no
irreparable harm to the unions and that no action would be necessary to maintain the NRAB's
jurisdiction over the dispute. 855 F.2d at 1288.
217. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Eastern Pilots H) (citing Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891,
922 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Furlough H) (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc)); National Ry. Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 830
F.2d 741, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1987).
218. Eastern Pilots HI, 869 F.2d at 1520 n.2. In Consolidated Rail, the Supreme Court
recently addressed but declined to resolve the issue of enjoining managerial action pending
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In creating the heaviest presumption of arbitration to date for
mid-term disputes arising under the RLA, Eastern Pilots II necessar-
ily embraces the view that disputes between parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement are better resolved in a private forum. The
approaches of the public and private forums are markedly different.
A system board21 9 that is faced with a minor dispute will emphasize
the parties' agreement, their expectations, and their past practices.22 °
On the other hand, a public forum would resolve the dispute with
more concern for public policy considerations and precedent.221 The
extent to which the system boards' decisions reflect judicial policy
considerations is an unexplored question under the RLA.
B. The 1988 Furlough: Post-Expiration Dispute Classification and
Union Animus
In the summer of 1988, Eastern Air Lines announced the largest
job reduction in its history. 222 Two-thirds of the employees affected
were union members represented by the International Association of
Machinists (IAM), the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), and the
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU).2 2 3 IAM, ALPA, and
TWU filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, requesting a preliminary injunction to halt the moves, and
claiming that management's decision was subject to major dispute res-
olution under Section 6 of the RLA.224
The district court granted the unions' request for an injunc-
minor disputes. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477,
2481 & n.5 (1989). The Consolidated Court noted that it had never recognized a statutory
obligation to enjoin management's actions; instead, the question remains open as to whether a
status quo injunction based on irreparable injury is available. Id. at 2481 n.5. In another case,
the Court reaffirmed the availability of injunctive relief to prevent labor from striking over
issues that'are subject to compulsory arbitration. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (1989) (P&LE H) (citing Railroad Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957)). For a discussion of P&LE H, see infra notes
371-82 and accompanying text.
219. System boards are the airlines' arbitration panels. See supra note 171.
220. See Lynch, Statutory Rights and Arbitral Values: Some Conclusions, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 617, 621 (1989).
221. Id.
222. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 703 F. Supp. 962, 974 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough I), rev'd, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Eastern Furlough H), reh'g en
banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Eastern's plans included closing its Kansas
City hub, a move eliminating 143 flights and furloughing 3388 employees. Eastern Furlough
H, 863 F.2d at 892-93.
223. The unions represent, respectively, Eastern's aircraft mechanics and ground services
personnel (including airline servicers, flight dispatchers, and baggage and cargo handlers),
Eastern's pilots, and Eastern's flight attendants. Eastern Furlough I, 703 F. Supp. at 965.
224. Eastern Furlough 11, 863 F.2d at 893. For a discussion of the major dispute procedure,
see supra note 171.
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tion.225 Applying reasoning that was rejected in a later Supreme
Court decision,22 6 the district court examined the magnitude of the
proposed changes and found the disputes to be major.2 27 The court
also concluded that the furloughs constituted anti-union bias because
"the clear and obvious targets of the downsizing are Eastern's
unions. ' 228  Finally, the court enforced the status quo and enjoined
Eastern from proceeding with the operational changes pending
exhaustion of Section 6 bargaining procedures.229
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously
reversed. 23 0  The court of appeals classified the dispute as minor 231
and concluded that if Eastern had taken any anti-union action, it was
based on a sufficient and independent motivation.232 The court also
found that because the dispute was minor, a preliminary status quo
injunction was unauthorized under Section 6 of the RLA.233 On the
unions' petition for rehearing, a divided en banc panel denied the
225. Eastern Furlough 1, 703 F. Supp. at 982.
226. In Consolidated Rail, the Court noted that "the formal demarcation between major
and minor disputes does not turn on a case-by-case determination of the importance of the
issue presented or the likelihood that it would prompt the exercise of economic selfhelp."
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2481 (1989).
227. Eastern Furlough I, 703 F. Supp. at 977-78. The court's reasoning that a dispute must
be classified according to the extent of its impact has some support in RLA case law. See
Local 553, Transp. Workers Union v. Eastern Air Lines, 695 F.2d 668, 673-74 (2d Cir. 1982).
For an examination of the impact approach, see National Ry. Labor Conference v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 830 F.2d 741, 747 n.5 (7th Cir. 1987).
228. Eastern Furlough I, 703 F. Supp. at 969-71. The court made extensive findings
concerning "Eastern's transfer of work and operations to Continental." Id. Those findings
included: (1) Frank Lorenzo's personal control and ownership of 50.7% of the voting stock of
Texas Air Corp., Eastern's parent corporation; (2) Continental's operation as a predominently
non-unionized carrier since its acquisition by Texas Air Corp. in 1982; (3) Texas Air Corp.'s
placement of both Texas Air and Continental officials in key positions at Eastern; (4) the
"close relationship" between officials of Eastern and Continental in resolving problems of
overlapping operations during pre-acquisition; (5) the coordination of efforts in order to "assist
Continental and frustrat[e] the collective bargaining representatives of Eastern's employees";
(6) since acquisition, Texas Air's "exert[ion of] every effort to curb union influence at Eastern
and to reduce wage rates and economic benefits previously obtained"; (7) a former Texas Air
official's unsuccessful attempt to reduce pilot wages after his transfer to Eastern; (8) Eastern's
unsuccessful transfer of fleet service work, previously performed by union employees, to a
wholly-owned subsidiary; (9) Texas Air's unsuccessful attempt to acquire all outstanding
shares of a special class of Eastern preferred stock; (10) Eastern's withdrawn attempt to
transfer its Northeast Shuttle to a new corporate entity controlled by Texas Air; and (11)
Eastern's withdrawn attempt to abrogate a scope clause with ALPA by utilizing non-Eastern
pilots to operate training flights to service Eastern in the event of a strike. Id. at 965-69.
229. Id. at 972-82.
230. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough II). The case was heard by Judges Buckley, Williams, and Sentelle. Judge
Williams wrote the opinion for the court.
231. Id. at 911-12.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 896.
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petition.234
The stark contrast between the district and circuit court opinions
attests to the complexities involved in applying a doctrine that is shift-
ing to a new definitional basis that frees management from some of
the operational constraints of a prior era. At the heart of each opin-
ion is a sense that the major-minor classification should be used to
further opposing policies. The district court's opinion seems to
embody the older notion, embedded in early applications of the classi-
fication, that management may not unilaterally make an extensive
restructuring decision without first talking with labor.235 At the other
extreme, the approach taken by the District of Columbia Circuit has
pushed the evolution of the law toward allowing management greater
freedom from statutory and contractual retraints in order to accom-
modate the forces of a deregulated market.
1. THE MAJOR-MINOR DETERMINATION
A balance between the relative bargaining positions of manage-
ment and labor is particularly difficult to achieve when a financially
ailing company seeks to restructure its operations. Under those cir-
cumstances, management's unilateral right to act increases in direct
proportion to labor's right to retain some control over a potential loss
of jobs.
In Eastern Furlough II, the District of Columbia Circuit
addressed the issue of whether management must bargain with labor
in a major dispute proceeding before implementing furloughs. 236 The
court first considered the agreement between Eastern and the TWU,
the only one of three Eastern labor agreements that was currently in
force.23 7 The TWU framed an argument based on the district court's
narrow interpretation of the scope of bargaining agreements. 238 The
union contended that the proposed furloughs were not anticipated by
either the existing collective bargaining agreement or the union's
acquiescence in past practices. 239 As a result, the union argued, East-
234. Id. at 913 (denial of rehearing en banc). Of the ten judges who participated in the en
banc proceeding, six wrote separately, and four dissented from the denial of a rehearing en
banc. Judges Ginsburg, Starr, Silberman, and Williams wrote separate concurrences. Judge
Mikva wrote a dissent in which Chief Judge Wald and Judges Robinson and Edwards joined.
Judge Edwards wrote a separate dissent.
235. The district court noted that "[m]assive layoffs are not, and shall never be, business as
usual." Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 703 F. Supp. 962, 974 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough I).
236. Eastern Furlough H, 863 F.2d at 892-93.
237. Id. at 897-98. For a discussion of mid-term disputes, see supra Section Ill(C).
238. Eastern Furlough 11, 863 F.2d at 897-98.
239. Id.
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ern was prohibited from implementing the furloughs until major dis-
pute procedures were exhausted.24
The District of Columbia Circuit examined the parties' collective
bargaining agreement to determine if management's claim of contrac-
tual permission for its actions was justified.241 The court read the
TWU agreement and the past practices of the parties expansively and
found that the parties considered furloughs to be permissible. 242
Although the agreement did not expressly specify a size limit for per-
missible furloughs, the court found that furloughs which were insig-
nificantly smaller than the present ones had occurred in the past.243
Thus, the court's interpretation of the parties' expectations brought
the present furloughs "arguably" within the contract's boundaries
both by the contract's express terms and by the parties' past prac-
tices.244 This broad reading of agreements and past practices during
the term of an agreement results in a presumption of arbitrability that
has been adopted by other circuits 245 and, recently, by the Supreme
Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives'Associ-
ation.246  The arbitration forum entitled management to furlough
TWU members pending resolution of the minor dispute. 247 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit's analysis of the dispute, however, implied
that the furlough was in fact contractually permitted and suggested
that management should win in arbitration. 248  The court's implica-
tion perhaps intruded on the system board's function of deciding the
issue on the merits. The possibility of this kind of judicial overstep-
240. Id; see supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. The unions additionally had argued
that the present furlough was different from those occuring in the past because the present
furlough was motivated by impermissible union animus in violation of Section 2(Third)-
(Fourth) of the RLA. Eastern Furlough I, 863 F.2d at 898. The court held that there was no
impermissible anti-union motivation for Eastern's actions. Id.
241. Eastern Furlough I, 863 F.2d at 897-98.
242. Id. The agreement outlined "extensive procedures whereby union members may be
furloughed due to 'reductions in force.'" Id. at 897.
243. Id. The court found .that furloughs of significant size had occurred in the past-
including one involving 1102 flight attendants-that was larger than the furlough of 1050 that
the court was evaluating. Id. The TWU argued that the past furloughs were qualitatively
different from the current one because they were seasonal. Id. In answer, the court reverted to
the agreement's "broad" language, which did not give a qualitative description of furloughs.
Id. at 897-98.
244. ld; see infra note 390 and accompanying text.
245. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 855 F.2d 1277, 1284
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 493 (1988); Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen v. Burlington N.
R.R., 829 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1987); Maine Cent. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 787 F.2d
780, 782 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
246. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989). For a discussion of Consolidated, see infra notes 388-94 & 435
and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
248. See Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 897-98.
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ping was the subject of a caveat announced by the Supreme Court in
Consolidated.24 9 The Court stated that its conclusion that a contrac-
tual claim was arguably justified did not impinge on the adjustment
board's jurisdiction to decide the merits. °
In the second part of its analysis, the court was faced with a more
troublesome dilemma because the other two unions' respective collec-
tive bargaining agreements with Eastern had expired.25 1 There is lit-
tle case law resolving post-expiration disputes, which are largely a
product of the deregulation of the airlines.252 A literal interpretation
of the RLA would permit labor automatically to trigger a major dis-
pute over wages, hours, or working conditions 253 with the filing of a
Section 6 notice during any contractual time frame.254 Upon the filing
of the notice, management could not restructure or disturb the status
quo until major dispute proceedings were exhausted. This approach
has been adopted for the post-expiration period by the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second 2 5 and Ninth25 6 Circuits, and it was
advocated by Judges Mikva and Edwards in their dissents from the
denial of a rehearing en banc in Eastern Furlough J1.217 It remains an
open question whether the Consolidated Court's adoption of arguable
justification for mid-term disputes will also be applied to the post-
expiration period.
At the opposite extreme from the literal interpretation of RLA
Section 6 is the expansive view of management prerogative that was
249. Consolidated, 109 S. Ct. at 2489. For a discussion of the delineation between the
major-minor determination and the merits, see infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text.
250. Consolidated, 109 S. Ct. at 2489.
251. Eastern Furlough 1, 863 F.2d at 898. For a discussion of post-expiration disputes, see
supra Section Ill(D).
252. Historically, railroads have used contracts that do not expire but are amended by the
filing of Section 6 notices. The Railway Labor Act was structured to accomodate this custom.
See infra notes 445-51 and accompanying text.
253. The RLA mandates that parties bargain over "wages, hours and working conditions."
RLA § 2(First), (Sixth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First), (Sixth); see supra notes 145-47 and
accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 445-51.
255. Air Cargo, Inc. v. Local Union 851, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 733 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1984).
256. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1985).
257. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 914-19 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Furlough II) (Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane). Judge
Mikva also noted that according to Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & North Western
Railway, 362 U.S. 330, 341 (1960), the filing of a Section 6 notice during an existing agreement
also may create a major dispute automatically. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 914-19
(Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane). For a discussion of Telegraphers,
see infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text. Judge Edwards also expressed his approval of
the status quo approach. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 919 (Edwards, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en bane).
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adopted in Eastern Furlough I. Under this view, the court of appeals
construed post-expiration agreements as broadly encompassing the
parties' past practices and implied contractual rights based on pre-
existing contracts.258 The dispute, therefore, becomes one concerning
the interpretation of expired contracts, rather than one involving con-
tract formation or amendment. As a result, the dispute is resolved
through the minor classification: Unilateral managerial action is per-
mitted but labor strikes are prohibited pending arbitration.25 9
A more restrictive view of management prerogative during the
post-expiration period effectively would entitle labor to bargain over a
broader range of restructuring decisions. Accordingly, management
would have to complete the lengthy major dispute procedure before
implementing whatever operational change labor challenges. Judge
Edwards, in his dissent from the denial of a rehearing in Eastern Fur-
lough II, interpreted the RLA as requiring this restrictive
approach.260 He added, however, that a dispute that essentially con-
stitutes an amendment to a collective agreement, thus triggering a
major dispute, may also trigger a minor dispute for a determination of
accrued rights.2 6 1
In adopting an expansive view of the statute, the District of
Columbia Circuit reasoned in Eastern Furlough II that the automatic
major dispute conclusion conflicts with precedent derived from
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. United Transportation
Union.2 62 In Shore Line, unions filed a Section 6 notice in response to
a railroad's creation of outlying assignments that relieved the railroad
of crew transportation and overtime expenses.2 63 The Supreme Court
held that the dispute was major, and imposed the status quo: "[T]he
status quo extends to those actual, objective working conditions out of
which the dispute arose and clearly these conditions need not be cov-
ered in an existing agreement." 2" In making its determination, the
Court emphasized that the purpose of the major classification's status
quo requirement and "elaborate machinery" was to prevent strikes
that would interrupt interstate commerce.2"5
258. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 897-98.
259. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
260. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 921-23 (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
261. Id.
262. 396 U.S. 142 (1969). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of Shore Line
in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 2584
(1989) (P&LE II), see infra notes 371-82 and accompanying text.
263. Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 143-46.
264. Id. at 153.
265. Id. at 148.
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The District of Columbia Circuit, however, miscast the reasoning
of Shore Line and its progeny in order to arrive at an opposite result.
The court used the Shore Line status quo inquiry, which evaluated the
parties' past practices in order to impose a freeze on working condi-
tions during a major dispute,266 as part of a dispute classification pro-
cess examining whether a claim was justified by past practices.267 As
Judge Edwards pointed out in his dissent from the denial of rehearing,
it is anomalous to equate using past practices to determine the scope
of a status quo order with the use of past practices to classify a dispute
as major or minor.268 Judge Edwards further pointed out that the use
of past practices to determine whether a dispute is arbitrable and to
use past practices to arbitrate the merits of the dispute are also two
separate inquiries.2 69  The past practices inquiry should not be
extended to dispute classification, but instead should be limited to the
status quo determination and the resolution of the merits of a
dispute.27 °
The use of the past practices inquiry in the dissimilar manner
proposed by Eastern Furlough H and Shore Line would have inappo-
site effects. 2 7' Shore Line's use of past practices did not permit man-
agement to act pending the outcome of the bargaining process while a
collective agreement was in effect.272 In contrast, Eastern Furlough
266. The Shore Line Court defined the status quo as requiring the parties to "preserve and
maintain unchanged those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly
conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are
involved in or related to that dispute." Id. at 153.
267. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 896-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough H), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
268. Id. at 923 (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
269. Id.
270. Id. Both the Eastern Furlough HI court's opinion and Judge Edwards' dissent from the
denial of a rehearing en banc referred to a Seventh Circuit opinion addressing the same issue in
a case involving a mid-term dispute. Id. at 899, 923. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the
Sixth Circuit that "the relevance of such arguments [concerning past practices] is more limited
in the characterization of the dispute than it is in the resolution of the merits; for example,
contractual language clearly prohibiting a certain action generally makes nonfrivolous an
argument that the practice is prohibited-no matter what the past practice." National Ry.
Labor Conference v. International .Ass'n of Machinists, 830 F.2d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 1987); see
also Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 745 F.2d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 1984).
Thus, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits appear to allow a limited look at past practices in order
to classify a mid-term dispute, but Judge Edwards would not allow the inquiry after an
agreement has expired. In Eastern Pilots I, Judge Edwards did not refer to past practices for a
mid-term classification of disputes. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d
1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Pilots H); see supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
271. For a further discussion of the manner in which the Eastern Furlough I court applied
the status quo concept to the classification question, see infra notes 433-34 and accompanying
text.
272. Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1969).
The Court stated that it was "incumbent upon the railroad by virtue of § 6 to refrain from
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ITs incorporation of past practices into the major-minor determina-
tion allowed management to act pending the arbitral resolution of a
dispute that occurred after the collective bargaining agreement had
expired.273 Furthermore, Judge Edwards' refusal to examine past
practices for the purpose of classifying a dispute may reflect the policy
that the resolution of the merits should occur within certain forums.
During mid-term disputes, Judge Edwards advocates a strong pre-
sumption of arbitrability that would classify a dispute as minor unless
a party's contractual claim was brought in bad faith.274 That pre-
sumption recognizes that the parties' agreement may be premised on
the common law of an industry, an area peculiarly within the exper-
tise of an arbitrator.275 After an agreement expires, however, a strong
presumption of arbitrability would inhibit the parties' efforts to reach
a new agreement over the same or similar matters because the parties
would be limited to interpreting rights gleaned from an expired agree-
ment. Resolution of a post-expiration dispute within a bargaining
framework, however, provides an opportunity for parties to create
new rights.
In Eastern Furlough II, one senses that the District of Columbia
Circuit was attempting to adapt a twenty-year-old railroad opinion to
a 1988 airline dispute in order to arrive at a more equitable result.
Shore Line is a classic example of an application of the RLA as
enacted: a mechanism that enables unions in a regulated industry to
amend collective bargaining agreements. Because railroad agree-
ments do not expire, a Section 6 notice is often labor's means of sig-
naling that it wishes to amend an agreement and prevent management
from acting in the process.2 76 The use of a Section 6 notice in the
deregulated airline market, however, may unnecessarily encumber the
carrier when mediation becomes too prolonged.
2 77
The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that because its
making outlying assignments at Trenton or any other place in which there had previously been
none, regardless of the fact that the railroad was not precluded from making these assignments
under the existing agreement." Id. at 154.
273. The Supreme Court has additionally indicated that Shore Line's definition of the status
quo was narrowly restricted to the facts of that case. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 2594-95 (1989) (P&LE H). The Court refused to apply
Shore Line to P&LE II, a case involving a railroad's obligation to bargain over the effects of its
decision to go out of business. Id. at 2594. The Court indicated that the status quo should not
be imposed with respect to working conditions that are not the subject of express or implied
agreements. Id. at 2594 n.15. For a discussion of P&LE II, see infra notes 324-26 & 371-82
and accompanying text.
274. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1522.
275. Id.
276. See infra notes 445-51 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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expansive interpretation of the agreement would have resulted in a
mid-term determination of a minor dispute, the interpretation should
have the same result in the post-expiration period.27 8 In support of its
classification of the dispute as minor, the court reasoned that it was
adopting the Supreme Court's determination that disputes that are
"independent" of an agreement are minor disputes.27 9 The Supreme
Court created that distinction in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co.
v. Burley28 ° when it held that the "acquisition of rights for the future"
are major disputes, while claims "independent of those covered by the
collective agreement" are minor disputes. 281 Arguably, the Eastern
Furlough H court is correct: A literal interpretation of the Supreme
Court's approach in Burley could mean that any claim not explicitly
included in a collective agreement could fall into the minor classifica-
tion. That conclusion, however, creates an overlap with the major
classification, which includes amendments to collective agreements.
Thus, it is more probable that the Burley Court's definition of minor
disputes was more limited than the District of Columbia Circuit's
interpretation. The Burley Court's entire statement classified as
minor those disputes "independent of those covered by the collective
agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injuries. '282 Presuma-
bly, the Court intended as minor those claims that typically were not
covered by collective bargaining agreements.283
In classifying Eastern's post-expiration disputes as minor, the
District of Columbia Circuit expanded the definition of arbitrable
matters to include the past practices of the parties, as well as matters
that are independent of an expired agreement. In doing so, it directly
reduced the scope of the major dispute classification and encroached
upon labor's statutory right to bargain collectively over the formation
and amendment of collective bargaining agreements.284
2. UNION ANIMUS
The operational flexibility that a minor classification gives man-
agement can be overridden by an injunction issuing from a finding of
278. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough II), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
279. Id.
280. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
281. Id. at 723.
282. Id.
283. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 922-23 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Eastern Furlough II) (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
284. Id.; cf. id. at 926-29 (Silberman, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
("[T]he panel opinion, in my view, does not purport finally to decide this question .... ").
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union animus under the RLA. Under Subsections 2(Third) 285 and
2(Fourth),286 the RLA broadly mandates that management may not
influence or interfere with the organization or activities of its
employees.
Eastern's unions claimed that under those sections, Eastern's fur-
lough plan amounted to coercive anti-union action.2 87 The unions
argued that the furlough represented an effort to transfer work to
Eastern's less unionized sister carrier, Continental; that it was another
step in "downsizing" the airline; that any business motivation resulted
from a deliberate attempt to "bleed" Eastern and inhibit unionization;
and that the furlough evidenced an intent to send a message to
employees that their unions were powerless to help them.288 In deal-
ing with this animus issue, the District of Columbia Circuit took
another significant step in its expansion of management prerogative.
285. Section 2(Third) of the RLA provides:
Representatives, for the purposes of this chapter, shall be designated by the
respective parties without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over
the designation of representatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way
interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives.
Representatives of employees for the purposes of this chapter need not be persons
in the employ of the carrier, and no carrier shall, by interference, influence, or
coercion seek in any manner to prevent the designation by its employees as their
representatives of those who or which are not employees of the carrier.
RLA § 2(Third), 45 U.S.C. § 152(Third).
286. Section 2(Fourth) of the RLA provides:
Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of
employees shall have the ight to determine who shall be the representative of the
craft or class for the purposes of this chapter. No carrier, its officers, or agents
shall deny or in any way question the right of its employees to join, organize, or
assist in organizing the labor organization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful
for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or
to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any
labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining,
or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coerce employees in an
effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any
labor organization, or to deduct from the wages of employees any dues, fees,
assessments, or other contributions payable to labor organizations, or to collect
or to assist in the collection of any such dues, fees, assessments, or other
contributions: Provided, that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
prohibit a carrier from permitting an employee, individually, or local
representatives of employees from conferring with management during working
hours without loss of time, or to prohibit a carrier from furnishing free
transportation to its employees while engaged in the business of a labor
organization.
RLA § 2(Fourth), 45 U.S.C. § 152(Fourth).
287. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 900-01. For a description of the unions' claims, see
supra note 182.
288. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 901.
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Without ruling on the question of whether Eastern's actions consti-
tuted union animus, the court found that an "insurmountable hurdle"
for the unions was presented by a line of NLRA cases28 9 descending
from Wright Line,29 ° which held that an employer is exonerated if it
can establish that it would have taken an action in the absence of
union animus.29' The hurdle was insurmountable because all the par-
ties and both courts agreed that there were legitimate business reasons
for the furlough.292
The court chose as determinative of the union animus issue the
line of NLRA cases that is most compatible with the philosophy of
immunizing management decisions from union attack.293 In Wright
289. Id. at 902.
290. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
291. Id. at 1088.
292. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 902. The en banc court criticized the panel's glossing
over of factual findings made by the district court. See id. at 914-15 (Mikva, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 920-21 (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
293. Under the NLRA, an expansive view of management prerogative has also led to an
erosion of the NLRA's unfair labor practice doctrine. The NLRA provision concerning union
animus is Section 8(a)(3), which prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of
union activity. Section 8(a) provides in part that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
Milwaukee Spring II demonstrated that an employer's motivation for restructuring is to
cut labor costs; the anti-union motivation will probably not prevent a restructuring decision.
Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984) (Milwaukee
Spring H), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For a discussion of
Milwaukee Spring II in the context of contractual interpretation, see infra notes 346-53 and
accompanying text. The NLRB said that the employer did not, as the union contended,
violate Section 8(d) by modifying the contract's wage provision, because it did not disturb the
wages at the Milwaukee facility when it transferred operations to a different plant where
workers were not covered by the contract. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602. Neither
did the employer violate the recognition clause, because that clause did not expressly preserve
bargaining unit work at the Milwaukee facility. Id.
The Board in Milwaukee Spring I had found that the employer's motivation of reducing
labor costs was "inherently destructive" under the doctrine of NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
388 U.S. 26 (1967), and thus constituted an unfair labor practice. Milwaukee Spring Div. of
Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206, 208 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring I), rev'd on reh'g, 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring H), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The Milwaukee Spring H Board, however, did not need to address that issue
because it found that the prior Board's finding was premised on a Section 8(a)(5) violation.
Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides that
management has a duty to bargain with a union over "wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment." NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Because the Milwaukee
Spring II Board found no violation of Section 8(a)(5), it consequently found no violation of
Section 8(a)(3). Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 604.
Earlier, the Supreme Court had found no violation of Section 8(a)(3) in a plant closing.
In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965), the
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Line, an employer terminated a union activist who allegedly also had
an unsatisfactory work history. 294 The NLRB ruled that after a union
makes out a prima facie case of unlawful anti-union motivation, the
employer can rebut the union's case by proving the existence of a
legitimate business reason for its action.295 In other words, the
employer must prove that it would have taken the action even in the
absence of the unlawful motivation. The Eastern Furlough II court
reasoned that application of Wright Line is particularly critical when
there is deep hostility between management and labor.296 On the facts
before it the Eastern Furlough II court concluded that application of
Wright Line neutralized claims of "generalized, free-floating union
animus" because there was no adequate causal connection between
any animus and Eastern's actions.2 97
Although there are two lines of cases within the NLRA regard-
ing this doctrine, the movement in this area appears to be toward the
application of the Wright Line principle.2 9 That principle allows an
employer more freedom than the principle derived from NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers,299 which either balances the equities if an action
was inherently destructive, or permits a union to prove that the
employer acted with an improper motive.3° If the Wright Line prin-
ciple is viewed as requiring total deference to any business motive,
management could conceivably provide an economic justification for
most attempts to replace union labor with non-union labor, thereby
depriving NLRA Section 8(a)(3) of much of its effectiveness against
Court held that under the NLRA, an employer has the right to terminate his business for any
reason. The Court rejected the AFL-CIO's argument that the action was essentially a
"lockout" or "runaway shop," both of which are illegal under the NLRA when used to
undermine a union. Id. at 271. Reasoning that when an employer goes out of business, it
retains no benefit from a diminished union, the Court held that complete liquidation of a
business does not implicate Section 8(a)(3), regardless of the employer's motivation. Id. at
271-72. The Court further held, however, that a partial closing of a business motivated by the
prospect of chilling union activity in remaining plants and having that foreseeable effect, would
constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(3). Id. at 274-75.
For a comparison of the Wright Line and Great Dane lines of cases, see Stone, Labor and
the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHi. L. REV.
73, 96-102 (1988).
294. Wright Line, a Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced,
662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
295. Id. at 1088.
296. Eastern Furlough I, 863 F.2d at 912. After quoting statements that each party
contended displayed animus on the part of the other, the court noted: "It seems fair to say
that tact and courtesy were not the hallmarks of discourse between Eastern and its unions."
Id. at 913.
297. Id. at 912.
298. Stone, supra note 293, at 98-102.
299. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
300. Id. at 33-34.
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unfair labor practice charges.3 °1
The District of Columbia Circuit's application of the Wright Line
principle to restructuring decisions drew criticism from those judges
who dissented from the court's denial of a rehearing en banc in East-
ern Furlough 11.302 Judge Mikva noted that the NLRB developed the
Wright Line test to determine whether an employer had committed an
unfair labor practice in an individual discharge dispute.30 3 Judge
Mikva contended that, as the NLRB had cautioned, the test was inap-
plicable to situations involving corporate restructurings.3 °" When an
employer discharges a single employee, he reasoned, there is a rela-
tively straightforward determination of whether or not the employee
was discharged as a result of participation in protected union activ-
ity.305 In contrast, in cases involving corporate restructuring, the
union animus issue is often clouded by post hoc rationalizations.30 6
Judge Mikva proposed that the appropriate test for restructuring deci-
sions was whether the action was motivated "by more than an insig-
nificant anti-union purpose. '30 7
Thus, in Eastern Furlough H1, the District of Columbia Circuit
rendered what is currently the most expansive interpretation of man-
agement prerogative for post-expiration disputes under the RLA. It
began by agreeing with other circuit courts that had decided that the
scope of existing collective bargaining agreements includes topics
"arguably" covered by the agreement. 3 8 Next, the court rejected the
Second and Ninth Circuits' method of automatically adopting major
301. The Court in Eastern Furlough H noted that the Great Dane line of cases was
primarily applicable when discrimination was based solely on union membership. It
distinguished that situation from one in which both union and non-union employees were
furloughed. Eastern Furlough 11, 863 F.2d at 902-03. But see Stone, supra note 293, at 101-02.
302. Eastern Furlough HI, 863 F.2d at 915-19 (Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). But see id. at 930-31 (Williams, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) (rejecting Judge Mikva's criticism of the court's application of Wright Line).
303. Id. at 915-16 (Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
304. Id. (citing NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 989 (1982)). Judge Mikva stated that even if Wright Line were the appropriate test in
the Eastern Furlough H situation, the panel erred by not remanding the case for application of
the test by the district court. Id. at 916.
305. Id. at 917. Judge Mikva noted that in the individual discharge situation, a list of
dischargeable offenses (contained in an employee manual or collective bargaining agreement)
and an established history of employee termination practices provide information that makes
the existence of union animus an easier determination. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 682 (1981)).
308. Id. at 896 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen v. Burlington N. R.R., 829 F.2d 617,
619 (7th Cir. 1987); Maine Cent. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 797 F.2d 780, 782 (1st Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986)).
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disputes in the post-expiration period;3"9 it held instead that those dis-
putes may be classified by examining expired agreements and past
practices. 310 Additionally, the court expanded the notion that topics
"independent" of expired collective bargaining agreements fall within
the scope of minor disputes. 31 1  Finally, the court adopted the
NLRA's Wright Line test for determining whether union animus
exists. Collectively, these concepts substantially increase the
probability that a restructuring decision arising after an agreement
expires will be deemed minor, thereby permitting management to take
unilateral action pending arbitration and significantly reducing both
labor's negotiating power over the decision and the scope of topics
over which management is subsequently obligated to bargain.
C. The Trump Shuttle Sale: Effects Bargaining
In October 1988, Eastern Air Lines announced that it had con-
tracted to sell its Northeast Shuttle division, which operated a shuttle
service among three Northeast cities, to Trump Shuttle.3"2 The pro-
posed sale affected approximately 700 full-time Eastern employees. 3
The three unions that brought suit in Eastern Furlough II-ALPA,
IAM, and TWU3 4-filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contending
that the sale constituted a major dispute and should be blocked pend-
ing bargaining.315 The unions also urged the court to enjoin the sale
because the action was motivated by union animus and illegal inter-
ference with the unions.31 6
Relying on the legal conclusions of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Eastern Furlough I, the district court denied the unions'
309. Id. at 898 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d 812
(9th Cir. 1985); Air Cargo v. Local Union 851, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 733 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1984)).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 898-99.
312. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Trump Shuttle). Eastern operated the shuttle for 25 years between LaGuardia Airport in
New York City and both Logan Airport in Boston, Mass. and National Airport in
Washington, D.C. Id. Trump Shuttle, Inc., owned and operated by real estate entrepreneur
Donald J. Trump, agreed to buy the profitable shuttle division for $365 million in cash. Id.
As a result of the March 5, 1989 strike by Eastern Machinists, Mr. Trump announced his
intention to reduce his purchase bid by at least a third. Trump Cuts Bid for Eastern's Shuttle
by 33%, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1989, at A2, col. 2.
313. The 700 union members affected by this change comprised 2.3% of Eastern's 30,500
employees, including approximately 200 pilots, 146 machinists, and approximately 250 flight
attendants. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 868.
314. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
315. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 867.
316. Id. at 870.
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request for an injunction.317 It found that the right to sell was com-
prehended by existing agreements and past practices, and thus the
dispute was minor."' It also rejected the unions' assertions of union
animus and illegal interference.31 9
Although the shuttle sale raised the same dispute classification
problem that was raised in Eastern Furlough II, the issues were cast in
a different light. In the shuttle sale, the question of management's
right to make a unilateral business decision involved an asset transfer,
a situation in which there is a greater potential for continued
employee protection than with a furlough. The district court dis-
agreed on three grounds with the unions' claim that management
must bargain over the sale's effects on employees. 320 First, the district
court noted that the District of Columbia Circuit followed the line of
RLA authority-later adopted in modified form by the Supreme
Court32 '-that did not require effects bargaining prior to implementa-
tion of a business decision. 22 Second, it held that classification of a
dispute as minor preempts effects bargaining.323 Finally, it held that
even if the NLRA requirement of "meaningful bargaining at a mean-
ingful time"3 24 over effects were followed, that requirement would be
met by Eastern's offer to participate in effects bargaining after pro-
ceeding with the sale. 325 By classifying the Trump Shuttle dispute as
minor, the district court permitted management to unilaterally make
and implement the decision to sell assets or restructure while negoti-
317. Id. at 879.
318. Id. at 873-77.
319. Id. at 877-78.
320. Id. at 876. "Effects" bargaining, as defined in the NLRA context, is required of an
employer that partially terminates its operations. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981). For a discussion of First National Maintenance, see infra notes 338-41
and accompanying text. Effects bargaining may include employee-suggested alternatives to the
management decision or suggestions for mitigating the effects of management's decision. See
Kohler, supra note 115, at 402-03.
321. See infra notes 371-82 and accompanying text.
322. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 876.
323. Id.
324. Id. (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1981)). In
First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court held that because an employer's "need to
operate freely" outweighed labor's right to participate in a decision to shut down part of a
business, the decision itself was not subject to mandatory bargaining. 452 U.S. at 686. In the
NLRA context, one commentator has argued that to make the "meaningful manner and at a
meaningful time" requirement effective, employers should notify unions of a possible unilateral
action as soon as serious planning begins and before the decision is implemented. See Harper,
supra note 139, at 1483.
325. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 876. Contra Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 845 F.2d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 1988) (P&LE I), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2584
(1989) (P&LE II) (holding that First National Maintenance demonstrates that effects
bargaining must occur within the major dispute framework).
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ating with employees over effects. The Third Circuit had arrived at
an opposite result, however, holding that the major classification is
the appropriate forum for effects bargaining over asset transfers.326
In classifying the dispute as minor, the district court in Trump
Shuttle applied the principles delineated by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Eastern Furlough /1.327 Following the court of appeals, rea-
326. P&LE , 845 F.2d at 429-32. In P&LE I, there was no disagreement that the collective
bargaining agreement did not explicitly permit or prohibit the sale. Id. at 428 n.9. Like the
district court in Trump Shuttle, the Third Circuit relied on the language in First National
Maintenance concerning entrepreneurial decisions. Id. at 429-32. The Third Circuit,
however, held that the NLRA's doctrine required the RLA parties to bargain over the effects
of the decision in a major dispute setting. Id. For a discussion of First National Maintenance,
see infra notes 338-41.
In reviewing the Third Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court recently provided some
clarification as to the scope of effects bargaining under the RLA. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE II). P&LE II involved a
railroad's sale of assets to a newly formed company, an action for which the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) provides expedited approval and, unless the circumstances are
exceptional, does not require labor protective provisions. Id. at 2596. Noting Congress'
general intent to deregulate the rail and air lines and Congress' specific intent to assist
financially ailing railroads through the ICC's expedited approval procedure, the Court held
that a carrier's decision to quit the railroad business by selling its assets was so much a matter
of management prerogative that the sale could go forward without being subject to the status
quo provisions of the major dispute procedure. Id. at 2597. The P&LE II Court supported its
conclusion of allowing management prerogative in a total asset sale with NLRA cases that
have produced the same result. Id. at 2595-96. The Court drew its policy considerations from
the NLRA cases of Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
("[A]n employer 'has an absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he
pleases .......") and First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (" '[T]he
harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut
down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that
might be gained through the union's participation in making the decision.' "). P&LE II, 109 S.
Ct. at 2595 & n. 17 (citing First Natl Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 686 and Darlington, 380 U.S. at
268). For a discussion of Darlington, see supra note 293. For a discussion of First National
Maintenance, see infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text. The Court required management
to bargain over the effects of the sale only to the extent that the union's proposals could be
satisfied by management itself without influencing the sale. P&LE II, 109 S. Ct. at 2595.
After P&LE II, only a remnant of effects bargaining remains for unions that file Section 6
notices after learning of an employer's decision to sell its assets and leave the business entirely.
Although the Court did not address the extent to which effects bargaining is required for
partial liquidations and for pre-sale demands to bargain, it held that an employer is not
required to give notice of a sale to its unions. Id. at 2597. The Court noted that it was limiting
its holding to the facts of the case-Section 6 notices were served after notification of the sale.
Id. at 2597 n. 19. Thus, in order for labor to protect its interests in a sale of assets, it must
bargain for prior notice of the sale. Such a clause would be enforceable through arbitration,
but unless a status quo injunction issued, the arbitration forum might offer few remedial
measures for labor. For a discussion of the availability of status quo injunctions, see infra note
411 and accompanying text. See also Stone, supra note 293, at 118. In the NLRA context,
moreover, the NLRB has been reluctant to order employers to undo business decisions even
after finding that the employers did not have the contractual right to implement such changes
unilaterally. See Harper, supra note 324, at 1483 & n.134.
327. See Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 873-77.
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soning, the district court considered the sale to be within the contem-
plation of the parties' past and existing collective agreements. 328 Due
to the Eastern Furlough I decision and due to the added employee
protection in the shuttle sale, the determination that the dispute was
minor was an easier task for the Trump Shuttle court than its previous
contrary conclusion in the Eastern furlough dispute.3 29 Additionally,
the district court drew on Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
NLRA in "analogous" situations that emphasized the concept that
management unilaterally may make certain fundamental business
decisions (such as the decision to terminate a portion of its business)
without incurring an obligation to bargain collectively.330 In a foot-
note, the court stated that "parallels between the Railway Labor Act
and the National Labor Relations Act should be drawn with cau-
tion," but "[w]here ... the language of the two Acts is nearly identi-
cal, the schemes similar, and courts have borrowed freely from the
cases decided under both Acts, there is no reason why NLRA prece-
dent may not be relied upon." '331
The unions' contention that Eastern was trying unlawfully to
undermine the unions through the sale of the shuttle division was
essentially the same argument that was unsuccessfully advanced by
the unions in Eastern Furlough 1/.332 As in Eastern Furlough H1, the
district court ruled that the unions failed to make a prima facie show-
ing that Eastern's union animus was a motivating factor in the sale of
the shuttle division, a showing that was required by Wright Line.3 33
The court reasoned that even if there were evidence of union animus,
328. Id.
329. The district court noted that Eastern had agreed to bargain with the unions over the
effects of the sale and that Mr. Trump had assured the unions that he would recognize them
and honor existing collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 869. In the agreement for sale,
Mr. Trump also guaranteed employment for Eastern's employees and promised to establish
wages and work rules identical to those previously in effect at Eastern. Id. Finally, he agreed
to change the wages and work rules in compliance with the RLA. Id. Because a sufficient
number of employees agreed to work for Trump Shuttle under these conditions, it was unlikely
that any employee furloughs would result from the transaction. Id.
330. Id. at 875 (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)).
331. Id. at 875 n.2. The district court also cited Eastern Furlough H as authority for
drawing parallels between the NLRB and the RLA. That passage, however, concerned the use
of economic force during the term of an agreement. The district court quoted the Eastern
Furlough H opinion: "[N]o reason [has been identified for] why the latter [RLA] requires us
to cast a more jaundiced eye on efforts to exert economic pressure than the former [NLRA]."
Id. (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Eastern Furlough H), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
332. Id. at 877 (quoting Eastern Furlough H, 863 F.2d at 903).
333. Id. at 877-78. For a discussion of Wright Line, see supra notes 290-307 and
accompanying text.
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legitimate financial considerations supported the sale.334
As with the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Eastern
Furlough II, the parallels drawn by the district court in Trump Shut-
tle raise a concern about the wisdom of superimposing NLRA statu-
tory interpretations on the RLA in disputes that arise after a
collective agreement has expired. The Trump Shuttle court relied
extensively upon Supreme Court cases that formulated the NLRA's
concept of fundamental management decisionmaking. Specifically,
the district court referred to Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence
advocating managerial freedom for decisions emanating from a "core
of entrepreneurial control, ' 335 and noted the Court's First National
Maintenance determination that no bargaining obligation was
required in a partial closure situation.336 Application of the NLRA
doctrine to resolve the RLA major-minor classification question for
post-expiration disputes is problematic, however, because of its
impact on the rights and relative power of the parties during the time
that they are bargaining over a new agreement with no existing agree-
ment in effect. 337 The issues that this application raises are discussed
in the following section.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF NLRA
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE DOCTRINE TO THE RLA
A. Doctrinal Considerations for Mid-Term Disputes
1. MID-TERM BARGAINING
Generally speaking, the mandatory-permissive distinction has
enabled tribunals resolving mid-term NLRA disputes to interpret
management prerogative in two expansive ways. The first method
categorizes many business restructuring decisions as permissive,
thereby freeing management to act without bargaining unless it is
contractually prohibited from doing So. 318 For example, in First
334. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 871. Eastern argued that its rapidly deteriorating
financial condition necessitated the sale. Id. More than $100 million in losses were expected
for the fourth quarter of 1988. Id. Eastern's management maintained that the sale would
enable the carrier to stay in business, stem rumors of near insolvency, and allow maintenance
measures. Id. The unions did not contest the fairness of the $365 million sale price, but they
disputed Eastern's claim that the sale was necessary for continued financial viability. Id. at
868, 871-72.
335. Id. at 875 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring)). For a discussion of Fibreboard, see infra note 338.
336. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 875 (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981)). For a discussion of First National Maintenance, see infra notes 338-
41 and accompanying text.
337. See infra Section V(B).
338. Those tribunals have identified an "employer's need for unencumbered
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National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,3 39 the United States Supreme
Court held that an employer need not bargain over a decision to close
part of its business, even if the decision was motivated primarily by a
desire to lower labor costs.3" The Court designated as mandatory
those decisions that are "amenable to resolution" and suggested a bal-
ancing test.34' The NLRB attempted to provide a more principled
basis for determining management rights in Otis Elevator Co.342 In
that decision, which remains the dominant NLRA interpretation of
the duty to bargain,343 a plurality stated that an employer must bar-
gain over operational changes only if the decision turns on a desire to
reduce labor costs. 3" After Otis, the NLRB's approach has often
been to exempt from bargaining any decisions that management can
justify with a profit motive.345
The second method tribunals use to enlarge mid-term manage-
ment prerogative under the NLRA is to broadly construe manage-
ment's rights under collective bargaining agreements. One version of
this view, exemplified by Milwaukee Spring II, is that the collective
agreement either does not explicitly contemplate a particular
mandatory topic or that it implicitly allows management the right to
unilateral action.346 In Milwaukee Spring II, an employer relocated
part of its operation to a non-union plant after bargaining to impasse
decisionmaking." First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981). The
springboard for an expansive interpretation of management rights under the NLRA was
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In Fibreboard, the Supreme
Court held that subcontracting is a decision of vital concern to management and labor and,
thus, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 211. Although the Fibreboard Court seemed
to take a broad view of Section 8(a)(5), the narrower scope given to the statute in Justice
Stewart's influential concurring opinion was perhaps of greater significance. Id. at 217
(Stewart, J., concurring). He cautioned that the majority's opinion should not be read to
impose a duty to bargain over decisions that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." Id. at
223. According to Justice Stewart, those decisions are embodied in the free enterprise system.
Id. at 225-26. They include decisions regarding investments and the basic scope of the
enterprise, and they are not subject to bargaining even though their implementation may result
in the loss of jobs. Id.
339. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
340. Id. at 676. The Court noted that when enacting the statute, Congress did not
anticipate that unions would become equal partners in business operations. Id.
341. Id. at 679.
342. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
343. Stone, supra note 293, at 93.
344. Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 893. Further, the NLRB stated that it would no longer make
decisions based on the kind of operational change involved in Otis. Id.
345. Stone, supra note 293, at 95-96. In Garwood-Detroit Truck Equip., Inc., 274
N.L.R.B. 113, 114-15 (1985), the NLRB viewed an employer's subcontracting decision;
motivated by a desire to reduce labor costs, as a legitimate decision to reduce overhead; thus,
the decision was a permissive topic. Stone, supra note 293, at 96.
346. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of I11. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1984)
(Milwaukee Spring II), aff'd sub nor. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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with its employees.347 The parties and the Board treated the reloca-
tion decision as a mandatory topic of bargaining. 34 Because the
agreement contained no explicit language restricting the employer's
action, however, the NLRB ruled that employee consent was not nec-
essary; thus, the employer could act after bargaining to impasse.349
On appeal, in UAW v. NLRB,35° the District of Columbia Circuit
agreed with the NLRB that Section 8(d) prohibited management from
altering mandatory topics without union consent unless management
had succeeded in obtaining a contractual waiver.35' Writing for the
court, Judge Edwards further reasoned that a topic is "contained in"
an agreement through a specific reference or through a "zipper"
clause.3 52 The inclusion of a zipper clause in a collective agreement
therefore precludes either party from implementing a change regard-
ing a mandatory topic or from demanding that the other party
bargain.
Thus, Milwaukee Spring II demonstrates that management is
only slightly restrained with regard to unilateral action over
mandatory topics by the necessity of bargaining to impasse with
labor. It is unclear, however, whether the policy of the courts and the
NLRB of allowing management more discretion in business decisions
is perpetuated in the arbitration setting.353
A corresponding judicial trend under the RLA furthers similar
policies of greater management discretion in decision-making and the
postulate that the parties' expectations should be resolved through
arbitration. Perhaps because of the airlines' transition from a regu-
lated to a deregulated market, and as a result of some courts' struggle
to accommodate that transition, at least four different approaches to
management prerogative issues exist. The first two approaches are
limited to the issue of whether a dispute is subject to bargaining. The
first method consists of an almost automatic deferral to union
347. Id. at 601.
348. Id. at 601 n.5. In Inland Steel, 275 N.L.R.B. 929, 936 (1985), however, the NLRB
determined that a relocation decision was not subject to mandatory bargaining because a desire
to reduce labor costs was not its sole motivation.
349. Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 602. The Board held that the relocation
decision was not contained in the wage and benefit provisions or the union recognition clause.
Id. The Board may have based its decision to grant management the right to act on the
management rights clause or on a reserved management rights theory. UAW v. NLRB, 765
F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
350. 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
351. Id. at 180.
352. Id. Zipper clauses incorporate all topics of bargaining into an agreement, effectively
closing out bargaining during the agreement's term. For a discussion of zipper clauses, see
supra note 164 and accompanying text.
353. See generally Lynch, supra note 36.
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demands to bargain over the statutorily mandated topics of "rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions. 3 54 The second analysis adopts the
NLRA's mandatory-permissive distinction to determine whether
management must bargain over the issue. In the third and fourth
approaches, which involve the question of whether disputes are sub-
ject to the major or minor classification, courts have used the auto-
matic deferral to bargaining analysis or varying degrees of deferral to
arbitration.
The first route involves a literal statutory interpretation of
whether the RLA mandates bargaining over the disputed issue. To
that end, an old yet still surviving line of authority appears to grant
labor an absolute right to demand bargaining over statutorily man-
dated topics unless a collective agreement explicitly permits the pro-
posed action. In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & North
Western Railway,35 5 a union filed a Section 6356 notice, which signifies
a major dispute, to prevent a financially ailing railroad from abolish-
ing and consolidating railroad stations. 311 The notice demanded that
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement be amended to
include terms that would prohibit abolition of jobs without union con-
sent. 358  Noting that the union's action "represent[ed] an attempt to
usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business
judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of
its operations, ' ' 359 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the carrier was not required to bargain over the deci-
354. RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156.
355. 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
356. Section 6 is the popular name for RLA § 6, which orovides:
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days'
written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference
between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes
shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time
shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such
notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with
reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by
either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has
been finally acted upon, as required by Section 155 of this title, by the Mediation
Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences
without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.
RLA § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156.
357. Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 332.
358. Id. Historically, RLA agreements do not expire; thus, any changes to an agreement
must be accomplished through the filing of a Section 6 notice. See infra notes 445-51 and
accompanying text.
359. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1959).
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sion.36  The United States Supreme Court reversed.3 6  The carrier
must bargain, the Court reasoned, because congressional intent, as
well as the custom of the railroad industry, justified a restrictive view
of management's right to unilateral action over statutorily mandated
bargaining topics.
362
In the second approach, which is also limited to the bar-
gainability issue, some courts have adopted the NLRA's mandatory-
permissive distinction by placing restructuring decisions that are not
expressly prohibited by a collective bargaining agreement in the
permissive category, and therefore outside the RLA's major dispute
procedure. 63 For example, in Japan Air Lines v. International Associ-
360. Id. at 260.
361. Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 343.
362. Id. at 337-38. The Court noted: "[I]t is impossible to classify as a minor dispute this
dispute relating to a major change, affecting jobs, in an existing collective bargaining
agreement, rather than to mere infractions or interpretations of the provisions of that
agreement." Id. at 341.
Subsequent courts have found that layoffs, work transfers, and wage concessions were
amendments to collective bargaining agreements and thus subject to major dispute procedures.
United Indus. Workers v. Board of Trustees, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965) .(layoffs); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Wien Air Ala., 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2289 (D. Ala. 1984) (wage
concessions); Ruby v. Airlift Int'l, 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2610 (D.D.C. 1972) (work transfers).
Recently, in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE II), the Supreme Court refused to apply
Telegraphers to a case in which a railroad company wished to retire from the railroad business;
the Court held that only a modicum of bargaining over the effects of the sale on employees was
necessary. Id. at 2595 & n. 17. For a discussion of P&LE II, see supra notes 324-26 and infra
notes 371-82 and accompanying text.
363. The First Circuit held, for example, that the RLA does not require a carrier to bargain
over its decision to sell the business. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines,
473 F.2d 549, 557 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). The court rejected the
union's argument that Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964),
should control, stating that the decision to merge is "much nearer the core of entrepreneurial
control." Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d at 557. For a discussion of Fibreboard, see supra note
338.
A party may include permissive topics among its Section 6 proposals. See T. KHEEL,
supra note 117, § 50.05[2], at 50-33. A strike may occur despite the failure to resolve a non-
bargainable demand. REA Express, Inc. v. BRAC, 358 F. Supp. 760, 773-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Additionally, labor may argue the permissive topic to impasse, but may not strike over it.
Japan Air Lines v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 538 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1976).
Courts have disagreed over the appropriateness of applying the mandatory-permissive
scheme to the RLA. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 n.23
(1981) ("The mandatory scope of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act . . . [is] not
coextensive with the National Labor Relations Act."); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal, 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969) ("[T]he National Labor Relations Act cannot
be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena. Even rough analogies must be drawn
circumspectly, with due regard for the many differences between the statutory schemes.")
(footnote omitted), reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1968); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. United
Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 902 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The use of the mandatory-permissive
distinction under the RLA is entirely consistent with its statutory framework."); Japan Air
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ation of Machinists,3" a union proposed a "scope" clause that would
prevent the carrier from subcontracting. 365 The union argued that
Section 2(First) of the RLA366 mandates bargaining over any proposal
advanced by either party.367 The Second Circuit disagreed.368 It held
that because the beneficiaries of the proposal would be newly hired,
the proposal did not concern present employees' "rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions"3 69 and thus, was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.37 °
Although most cases applying the mandatory-permissive distinc-
tion to the RLA have addressed only the statutory question of
whether the dispute was subject to bargaining, 37I recent courts have
borrowed the entrepreneurial policy behind the mandatory-permissive
distinction to determine whether a dispute should be resolved by col-
lective bargaining or arbitration.372 In this third group of cases,
courts combine a contractual and statutory approach by considering
whether a management prerogative issue is statutorily mandated as
being subject to major dispute resolution or rather is a matter of con-
tractual interpretation that is more properly left to the system board
Lines, 538 F.2d at 51-52 (mandatory-permissive distinction applied to reject union's argument
that parties must bargain over any proposal).
364. 538 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1976).
365. Id. at 47-48. Japan Air Lines is illustrative of the mandatory-permissive distinction
where the dispute over the necessity of bargaining arose in the post-expiration period.
366. Section 2(First) of the RLA provides:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of
the application of such agreements or otherwise, or in order to avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any
dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.
RLA § 2(First), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First).
367. Japan Air Lines, 538 F.2d at 51.
368. Id.
369. RLA § 2(First), 45 U.S.C. § 152(First).
370. Japan Air Lines, 538 F.2d at 52.
371. See, e.g., id. at 48-49 (The carrier filed suit to enjoin the union from striking after the
parties' major dispute negotiations had ended in impasse.); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
Transamerica Airlines, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2682 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (The court found that the
carrier's decision to go out of business was neither a major nor a minor dispute.); Independent
Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, 502 F. Supp. 1013 (D.D.C. 1980)
(Noting that the union had not yet filed a grievance, the court held that the closing of a flight
attendant base was neither a major nor minor dispute.).
372. The Supreme Court used a similar philosophical vision of the RLA, citing First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), and Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 & n.17 (1989) (P&LE II). For a discussion of
First National Maintenance, see supra note 338-41. For a discussion of Darlington, see supra
note 293.
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in the minor dispute setting. In deciding this major-minor issue, the
district court in Trump Shuttle3 73 and the Third Circuit in Railway
Labor Executives' Association v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad
(P&LE I)374 arrived at opposite results in classifying disputes over
asset transfers.37 5 Although the Trump Shuttle dispute arose after the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and the P&LE I dis-
pute arose during the term of an agreement, 376 both courts used simi-
lar methods for classifying disputes. Each court examined agreements
for language contemplating the action,377 then relied on the
entrepreneurial language of First National Maintenance 37 to deter-
mine, respectively, a minor and major dispute over the effects of the
decision to sell.379 The P&LE I court relied on the Telegraphers deci-
sion to hold that the dispute was major because the collective agree-
ment did not address the action.38° Conversely, the Trump Shuttle
court examined the parties' expired collective bargaining agreements
for evidence of past practices, found that the action was "arguably"
contemplated by the agreements, and held that the dispute was
minor.381 In reviewing the Third Circuit's P&LE I decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that Telegraphers did not apply to
373. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Trump Shuttle). For a discussion of Trump Shuttle, see supra Section IV(C).
374. 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988) (P&LE I), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE H).
375. The P&LE I court determined that management's decision to sell a rail line was
neither permitted or prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 428 n.9. The
Trump Shuttle court, on the other hand, found that the shuttle sale was "arguably" covered by
the collective bargaining agreement. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 873.
376. P&LE 1, 845 F.2d at 428; Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 873.
377. P&LE I, 845 F.2d at 428 n.9; Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 873.
378. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Other courts have also
applied the First National Maintenance reasoning in an RLA context. See Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l v. Transamerica Airlines, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2682, 2686-87 (E.D.N.Y.). For a
discussion of First National Maintenance, see supra notes 338-45 and accompanying text. The
Transamerica court noted that Section 8(d) of the NLRA was "nearly identical" to Section
2(First) of the RLA, which requires a carrier to bargain over "rates of pay, rules, and working
conditions." Transamerica, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2687 (comparing RLA § 2, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, and NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)). The court concluded that it could find no
reason why an air carrier should be required to bargain over its decision to go out of business
solely because it is covered by the RLA. Id; see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. United Air
Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 902 (7th Cir. 1986) (The mandatory-permissive distinction is consistent
with the RLA dispute resolution mechanism.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
379. P&LE I, 845 F.2d at 429-32; Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 876. The Trump Shuttle
court noted that the District of Columbia Circuit in Eastern Furlough H had split from the
Third and Ninth Circuits, holding that effects bargaining may take place after a unilateral act.
Id. (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 898, 900, 913 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (Eastern Furlough H), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
For a discussion of these cases, see supra Section IV.
380. P&LE I, 845 F.2d at 430-31.
381. Trump Shuttle, 701 F. Supp. at 873-74.
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a situation in which a railroad sells assets in order to leave the
business.382
Other courts, such as the District of Columbia Circuit in Eastern
Pilots II,383 classify disputes under a fourth approach that tends to
default to arbitration for the major-minor determination by expan-
sively interpreting collective agreements for purposes of the question
of arbitrability. This move designates all disputes as minor unless
claims of contractual justification are brought in bad faith.384 Thus,
this approach, like the Telegraphers analysis, presumes arbitration
rather than bargaining for mid-term disputes.
As the courts' various approaches demonstrate, the determina-
tion of whether a dispute arising during the term of a collective agree-
ment is major or minor may lead to disparate results. The trend
toward allowing management more prerogative to act has created a
shift away from the bargaining forum and toward a presumption of
arbitrability during this stage of the collective agreement.
2. MID-TERM ARBITRATION
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming the primary means for
resolving mid-term disputes over managerial actions under both the
RLA and the NLRA. In addition to deferring questions of contract
interpretation, the NLRA's deferral doctrine operates to defer statu-
tory issues, such as unfair labor practice charges, to arbitration. For
example, in the context of NLRA mid-term disputes over proposed
restructuring actions, the underlying question is usually a straightfor-
ward contractual issue: whether labor waived its statutory right to
bargain or to consent to the action.3 85 This issue may create a tension
between contractual provisions, typically management rights clauses
and "zipper" clauses.386 The tension is resolved by an arbitrator, who
may also consider the parties' past practices and expectations in inter-
382. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2584, 2595
n.17 (1989) (P&LE H). The Supreme Court did not frame the issue as a major-minor
question, but rather as whether, and to what extent, the employer was required to bargain over
the asset sale's effects on employees. Id. at 2592. In dissent, Justice Stevens stated that
"[t]here is no relevant difference between the partial abandonment in Telegraphers and the
transfer of ownership proposed in this case: in both, rail service would continue as before, but
many employees would lose their jobs." Id. at 2602 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, with Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., joining).
383. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots II). For a discussion of Eastern Pilots H, see supra Section IV(A).
384. Eastern Pilots HI, 869 F.2d at 1523.
385. See Edwards, supra note 161, at 34.
386. See UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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preting the agreement.3 "7
In the RLA context, courts are also focusing on arbitration as
the key dispute resolution forum during the life of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association,88 the Supreme Court adopted the view of
many federal courts of appeals:3 89 Minor disputes include those that
are "arguably" covered by existing bargaining agreements. 9 °
387. See Edwards, supra note 161, at 34.
388. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
389. See Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen v. Burlington N. R.R., 829 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1987); Maine Cent. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 787 F.2d 780, 782 (1st Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
390. Consolidated, 109 S. Ct. at 2482. Thus, disputes that might have been considered
major disputes in regulated days because they determined future rights are now subjected to a
determination of whether they are "arguably covered" by an agreement; if so, they are
assimilated into the minor classification. The federal courts of appeals appear to echo an
NLRA concern that bargaining obligations should not attach to those decisions that are at the
"core of entrepreneurial control." That concept was first articulated in Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring), and later broadened in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666 (1981). See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
The Seventh Circuit has been at the forefront of the "arguable" standard. National Ry.
Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 830 F.2d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 1987)
(citing Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 734 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1984));
see also Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir.
1987); Brotherhood of R.R. Signalmen v. Burlington N. R.R., 829 F.2d 617, 619 (7th Cir.
1987). In Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Railway Labor Executives
Association, 855 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 493 (1988), a financially
distraught carrier decided to sell a portion of a rail line and concurrently eliminate more than
300 related jobs. The union filed Section 6 notices, but the carrier refused to bargain. Id. at
1280. The Seventh Circuit held that because the job elimination issue was "arguably" covered
by the collective bargaining agreement and the past practices of the parties, the dispute was
minor. Id. at 1285. The court ruled that:
[W]here a rail carrier and a union(s) disagree as to the proper categorization of a
labor dispute under the RLA, the federal courts must delineate a matter a minor
dispute unless the carrier's claims of contractual justification are so frivolous or
obviously insubstantial as to indicate that it is attempting to circumvent the § 6
RLA major disputes resolution procedure.
Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's incorporation of past practices into an expansive interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements grants management the right to implement restructuring
decisions pending arbitration unless management's claim of contractual justification is frivo-
lous or unless a court issues a status quo injunction pending arbitration. The court grounded
its conclusion on a theory of deferral to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes in the railroad industry. Id. at 1286. The court also
stated a concern for minimizing strikes, which would also be prevented by enforcement of the
status quo for the duration of a major dispute proceeding. Id. at 1286-87.
The federal courts of appeal have not been in complete agreement on the standard to be
applied in this area. The Eighth Circuit has held that only a "clear departure" from the par-
ties' past practices falls in the major dispute category. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N. R.R., 802 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1986). The Fifth
Circuit has adopted a "wholly spurious" standard. Ruby v. Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A., 439 F.2d
1359, 1363 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 44:539
MERGING THE RLA AND THE NLRA
Although Consolidated raised the issue of whether a railroad's
attempt to expand its implied right to test its employees for drugs was
a major or minor dispute,39' the Court did not limit its discussion of
major and minor disputes to the facts of the case. Rather, the Court
drew heavily from NLRA precedent to emphasize both the
employer's "right to be flexible"3 92 and the desirability of allowing
arbitrators to use their peculiar expertise to decide issues that reflect
"'the common law of [the] particular industry.' ,93 Because the
Court found that the railroad's claim was neither frivolous nor obvi-
ously insubstantial, it deemed the dispute a minor one.3 94
In a recent decision written before Consolidated, the District of
Columbia Circuit, with Judge Edwards writing for the court, pushed
the presumption of arbitrability for mid-term disputes to its greatest
length in the RLA context. In Eastern Pilots H, 3 9 5 the court held that
a dispute is minor even if it is frivolous.3 96 The court correspondingly
narrowed the operation of mid-term major disputes, holding that a
major dispute must arise from an agreement's "repudiation" that is so
severe it amounts to bad faith.397
Because arbitration under both statutes is becoming so crucial to
the resolution of mid-term disputes, it is useful to examine the scope
of an arbitrator's authority. If a topic is judicially determined to be
arbitrable in the NLRA context, the Supreme Court in AT&T Tech-
nologies v. Communications Workers398 has held that the determina-
tion is dispositive of the threshold issue of arbitrability.399 In other
words, after a court decides whether a dispute is arbitrable, an arbi-
trator may not again address the question of whether the dispute is
grounded in a collective bargaining agreement and therefore arbitra-
ble. Rather, the arbitrator's authority is restricted to deciding the
merits of the dispute. The Court's presumption recognizes the greater
competence of arbitrators in interpreting agreements, the national
labor policy of peaceful dispute resolution, and the parties'
391. Consolidated, 109 S. Ct. at 2479.
392. Id. at 2483.
393. Id. at 2484 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 579 (1960)).
394. Id. at 2489. For a discussion of the injunctive relief dicta in Consolidated, see infra
note 411.
395. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots II). For a discussion of Eastern Pilots II, see supra Section IV(A).
396. Eastern Pilots II, 869 F.2d at 1522.
397. Id. at 1523 (citing Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 384 F.2d 323
(D.C. Cir. 1967)).
398. 106 S. Ct. 1415 (1986).
399. Id. at 1420.
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objectives. 00
A related dilemma surfaces when the question of whether a dis-
pute is subject to bargaining depends on whether a moratorium
clause, which provides that an agreement is not amendable until a
certain date, precludes the dispute."° For example, in St. Louis
Southwestern Railway v. United Transportation Union," 2 a union filed
a Section 6 notice regarding caboose design specifications. 4° 3 After
the carrier participated in the major dispute procedure, it obtained an
injunction against the union's strike,' arguing that the collective
agreement contained a moratorium provision that precluded the
union from filing Section 6 notices over certain managerial actions." 5
The Fifth Circuit framed two issues: (1) Was the dispute concerning
whether the moratorium provision precluded a major dispute over the
caboose proposal a matter of contractual interpretation and therefore
a minor dispute; and (2) if so, did resolution of the minor aspect of the
dispute control the resolution of the major aspect?4°6 The court
answered both questions affirmatively."°7 It held that the union's
desire to bargain over the caboose proposal was a question that was
arguably comprehended by the moratorium provision in the collective
agreement. 4 8 The court further held that the union must be pre-
cluded from striking pending resolution of the arbitrable issue in
order to preserve the purpose of the moratorium." 9 Most courts
agree that the interpretation of a moratorium clause is a minor dis-
pute and that strikes may be enjoined pending resolution of the
dispute.41 °
As St. Louis Southwestern illustrates, when issues are compre-
hended by a collective bargaining agreement, there are two divergent
sets of rules contained in the major and minor classifications that
could potentially govern the parties' actions. The courts' solution
400. Id.
401. For a discussion of moratorium clauses, see supra notes 161-66 and accompanying
text.
402. 646 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1981).
403. Id. at 231.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 232.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 232-33.
408. Id. at 233.
409. Id. at 232.
410. See Seaboard World Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 425 F.2d 1086, 1090 (2d
Cir. 1970); Burlington N. R.R. v. Railroad Yardmasters, 79 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11,797, 11,798
(N.D. Ill. 1976); Southern Pac. Transp. v. Railway & Steamship Clerks, 81 Lab. Cas. (CCH) T
13,113 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 69 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2616, 2618 (N.D. I11. 1968).
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that the parties must first arbitrate the bargainability of the dispute
does not resolve the potential imbalance in the parties' relative posi-
tions should the arbitration board find that the dispute is subject to
bargaining. Management's ability to unilaterally act during the minor
dispute process would necessarily relegate labor to bargaining over
the effects of management's actions. A judicial determination of the
bargainability of a dispute, or an injunction issuing to prevent man-
agement from acting, would provide a more equitable result than per-
mitting management to act pending arbitration for a determination of
bargainability.41 '
Viewed from the perspective of the arbitration procedure itself,
the presumption of arbitrability operates in dissimilar fashions under
the NLRA and under the RLA. During the NLRA's arbitration pro-
cedure, management is free to act under the obey and grieve doc-
trine,412 and is subject to no statutory restraints if it acts regarding a
permissive subject.4"3 On the other hand, no-strike clauses typically
prevent labor from striking as a quid pro quo for management's con-
sent to arbitrate disputes.4"4 Furthermore, courts are reluctant to
enjoin management's actions over contractual interpretation issues.4"5
If the topic is mandatory, however, and the agreement contains a
clause regarding the topic, management's unilateral action may result
in a Section 8(d) unfair labor practice charge that would probably be
deferred to arbitration for an interpretation of the contractual
clause.41 6 Deferral may result in no injunctive restraint on manage-
411. In a recent Supreme Court case, the union argued for such an injunction by suggesting
that a dispute over management's expansion of an implied right to test for drugs be termed a
"hybrid" dispute. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
2477 (1989). The union proposed that a hybrid dispute should go before the adjustment board
for a determination of its classification while the employer is enjoined from implementing the
change. Id. at 2483. The Consolidated Court rejected the union's argument. Id. That
approach, the Court noted, "unduly constrains the freedom of unions and employers to
contract for discretion." Id. The Court made clear that although it was classifying the conflict
as minor, it was not deciding the merits of the case; the adjustment board might rightfully
decide that the dispute was, in fact, a major one. Id. The Court refused, however, to
anticipate a major dispute by enjoining the employer's actions. Id. Because the union did not
base its claim for injunctive relief on irreparable injury, the Court left open the question of
whether status quo injunctions based on irreparable injury would be appropriate in such
circumstances. Id. at 2481 n.5. No showing of irreparable injury is required for an injunction
to issue against an employer during a major dispute. See Detroit & T. Shore Line R.R. v.
Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
412. For a discussion of the "work first, grieve later" principle, see Lynch, supra note 36, at
294 n.303.
413. For a discussion of permissive topics, see supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
See also Lynch, supra note 36, at 278-84.
414. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
415. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 294.
416. See id. at 281-82.
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ment's actions regarding a mandatory issue. Thus, for both
mandatory and permissive issues, the practical deterrent for manage-
ment's action is the possibility of an eventual arbitral damages assess-
ment. Pending arbitration, however, courts may enjoin a strike.417
Few courts interpreting the RLA have borrowed the NLRA's
mandatory-permissive doctrine. The Supreme Court, however, in
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Associ-
ation (P&LE 1),4'18 appeared to find that an asset sale occuring
midterm was, in effect, permissive. Thus it would be incumbent on
labor to incorporate the right to bargain over a sale in a collective
agreement, with the dispute shifting to the arbitration forum for inter-
pretation. Pending arbitration, RLA parties' relative power some-
what resembles that of NLRA parties. Injunctive relief against
managerial action has not been widely used, however, partly because
it has not been argued.4"9 In that sense, the relative power of the
parties under the RLA minor dispute prodedure appears to be similar
to that under the NLRA if the disputed NLRA topic is permissive;
moreover, the practical consequences of eventual arbitral remedies
may similarly operate to effectively restrain managerial action under
both statutes.
The RLA's counterpart to an NLRA unfair labor practice
charge is a statutory claim of union animus based on Subsections
2(Third) and 2(Fourth), a claim which is resolved by the courts.420
Although cases deciding the union animus issue are few, the District
of Columbia Circuit has adopted an NLRA standard that is protec-
tive of management's right to make operational decisions based on
417. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
418. 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989). The judicial construction of the RLA permits only
management to use economic force pending arbitration; management may take unilateral
action, but labor may not strike. Chicago River, 353 U.S. at 30. Contra T. KHEEL, supra note
117, § 50.06, at 50-36 ("[J]udicial rule prohibits either party from taking unilateral economic
action to enforce its position .... ") (citing St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 646
F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1981)). A federal court may exercise its discretion to issue a status quo
injunction when allowing management to act would foreclose meaningful relief. See Railway
Express Agency v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 437 F.2d 388, 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 919 (1971); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, 502 F.
Supp. 1013, 1019 (D.D.C. 1980).
419. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1521 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Eastern Pilots II) ("In the present case, however, the Union has not claimed that it is
entitled to a minor dispute injunction."); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863
F.2d 891, 913, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Eastern Furlough H) (Edwards, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) ("Since TWU has not sought application of this equitable
principle, we need not consider the issue.").
420. For a discussion of the union animus charge brought in Eastern Furlough HI, see supra
Section IV(B)(2) and accompanying text.
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economic concerns.42 1 The issue therefore has little effect on the clas-
sification of a dispute as major or minor.
B. Doctrinal Considerations for Post-Expiration Disputes
1. POST-EXPIRATION BARGAINING
The expansion of management prerogative under the RLA in
this bargaining time frame can be seen in the restriction of the status
quo during bargaining and misapplication of the status quo concept to
classify disputes. Both the NLRA and the RLA statutorily mandate
maintenance of the status quo during negotiations for new agree-
ments, thereby blocking the use of economic weapons during bargain-
ing. This requirement lacks more than minimal force within the
NLRA because'the bargaining process may quickly result in impasse,
thereby releasing management from the status quo. In the RLA con-
text, however, the length of the major dispute procedure gives the
status quo requirement more impact and, after deregulation, results in
more bargaining power for labor.
With post-expiration disputes, as with mid-term disputes, some
courts have narrowed the operation of the major classification and
expanded the minor classification, a move that frees management to
act. Presuming arbitration after an agreement expires, however, is
more troublesome than presuming arbitration during the term of an
agreement. The problems are evident in some courts' use of the status
quo.4 22 In Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. United Transpor-
tation Union,423 the Supreme Court defined the status quo as the obli-
gation of the parties "to preserve and maintain unchanged those
actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived,
which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and
which are involved in or related to that dispute .... [C]learly these
conditions need not be covered in an existing agreement. 424
After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (P&LE 11),425
however, it is uncertain to what extent the status quo definition in
Shore Line survives. P&LE H involved the question of whether a rail-
road must bargain over the effects of its decision to sell its assets and
421. Id.
422. See, e.g., Eastern Furlough HI, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc denied, 863
F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Maine Cent. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 787 F.2d 780, 782-
84 (lst Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
423. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
424. Id. at 152-53.
425. 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE II).
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
go out of business.42 6 In its discussion of the status quo provision of
Section 6, the Court noted that Shore Line's inclusion of "objective
working conditions" '427 in the status quo requirement "extended the
relevant language of [Section 156] to its outer limits. '428 The Court
further noted:
[I]t is surely arguable that [Section 156] is open to a construction
that would not require the status quo with respect to working con-
ditions that have never been the subject of an agreement, expressed
or implied, and that, if no notice of changes had been served by the
union, could be changed by the carrier without any bargaining
whatsoever.429
The Court's refusal to apply the status quo resulted in a limited bar-
gaining requirement in P&LE II despite the dissent's argument that
the working conditions that should be preserved must include
employees' jobs.43° Rather, the Court was protective of the
employer's right to make an unrestrained decision to close its busi-
ness.43 The Court's refutation of the status quo with respect to the
asset sale appears to be a reflection of the policy underlying the
mandatory-permissive distinction in the NLRA.432 Management is
not obligated to bargain over the "permissive" decision to sell a busi-
ness unless labor previously had succeeded in incorporating the right
to consent to a sale in the collective agreement.
Although Shore Line's facts involve the application of a status
quo injunction in a major dispute,433 the Eastern Furlough I court
borrowed from Shore Line's definition of the status quo concept in
order to classify a dispute as minor.434 This move confuses the initial
inquiry of dispute classification with the subsequent question-should
the dispute be labeled major-of the boundaries of the status quo.
Under the Eastern Furlough H court's version of dispute classifica-
tion, a court must examine an expired collective agreement and the
past practices of the parties in order to determine the merits of a dis-
pute. In actuality, however, the Court is also necessarily defining the
limits of the status quo. This occurs because the parties are simulta-
426. Id. at 2592.
427. Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 153.
428. P&LE HI, 109 S. Ct. at 2594.
429. Id. at 2594 n.15.
430. Id. at 2602 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, with Brennan,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., joining).
431. Id. at 2595-96.
432. For a discussion of the mandatory-permissive doctrine under the NLRA, see supra
notes 129-45 & 151-70.
433. Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 143.
434. See supra Section IV(B) (discussing Eastern Furlough II).
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neously engaged in bargaining over a new collective agreement; the
status quo inquiry also requires examination of expired collective
agreements and the past practices of the parties. Using the definition
of the status quo to classify disputes therefore creates an overlap
between the RLA's arbitration and bargaining frameworks, and con-
fuses the RLA's dispute resolution mechanism.
To illustrate, during the term of an existing agreement, a contro-
versy over whether a restructuring decision constitutes a major or
minor dispute is initially a question of whether the collective bargain-
ing agreement specifically addresses the restructuring. The Supreme
Court recently held in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association435 that disputes arguably comprehended by
existing agreements are within the system board's jurisdiction for res-
olution of the merits.436 The District of Columbia Circuit would go
even further than the Supreme Court in applying a liberal standard
for mid-term disputes; Eastern Pilots H 437 requires that all mid-term
conflicts be submitted to the system board for arbitration unless con-
tractual claims are brought in bad faith.43
After an agreement has expired, however, some courts hold that
service of a Section 6 notice439 regarding a conflict over wages, hours,
or working conditions automatically triggers a dispute over future
rights and establishes a major dispute."' Management is thereby pro-
hibited from acting, and labor from striking, while the two bargain
over the subject of the Section 6 notice. The Eastern Furlough H
court took the opposite approach and created a presumption of arbi-
trability during the post-expiration period."'
After a party signals that it wishes to begin bargaining over a
new agreement, a dispute may result when management acts in a
manner that it claims is permitted by the status quo. If labor dis-
agrees, it will file a Section 6 notice demanding bargaining over the
action, and demanding that management adhere to the status quo,
435. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
436. Id. at 2482; see supra notes 388-94 and accompanying text.
437. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots H).
438. See supra Section 111(A); supra notes 395-97 and accompanying text.
439. The RLA provides that a party may file a Section 6 notice to signify that it desires to
bargain over a term. For a description of Section 6 notices, see supra note 117.
440. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Aloha Airlines, 776 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir.
1985); Air Cargo v. Local 851, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 733 F.2d 241, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1984).
441. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough II), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For a more
complete discussion of the Eastern Furlough II court's approach, see supra notes 251-84 and
accompanying text.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
which labor will claim does not permit the action. At this point, the
issue is to define the rules that govern management's actions. The
District of Columbia Circuit's "status quo" concept examined expired
agreements and past practices to find that the parties' expectations
encompassed management's proposed actions. 442 Accordingly, the
court labeled the dispute as minor.443
This move to classify post-expiration disputes as minor has been
criticized as an usurpation of the arbitrator's function. 4 It is within
the special province of an arbitration board to examine the "common
law" of an industry by considering expired collective bargaining
agreements and past practices in its resolution of the merits. Thus,
the District of Columbia Circuit took the statutory concept of pre-
serving the parties' environment while bargaining over a new agree-
ment, and expanded the arbitration forum to encompass it. This
definitional circularity blurs the parties' rights in both forums, and
severely limits management's duty to bargain with labor over the full
range of a new collective agreement.
The conflicting interpretations of the status quo result in part
from a transition in the operation of collective bargaining agreements.
Congress structured Section 6 notices, which trigger the status quo, to
accommodate the railroads' custom of using "open-end" agree-
ments.44 Open-end agreements are those that do not expire but may
be modified when one party notifies the other through a Section 6
notice that it wishes to change certain contractual provisions. " 6 The
Section 6 filing works primarily to enable labor to force management
to bargain over new demands. For example, in Order of Railroad
Telegraphers v. Chicago & North Western Railway,447 the Supreme
Court held that a union could force management to bargain over the
union's proposed amendment to its collective bargaining agreement
442. Eastern Furlough 11, 863 F.2d at 913.
443. Id.
444. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 704-05 (7th Cir.
1987); National Ry. Labor Conference v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 830 F.2d 741,
746-47 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he relevance of such arguments is more limited in the
characterization of the dispute than it is in the resolution of the merits ...."); Maine Cent.
R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 787 F.2d 780, 782 (1st Cir.), ("[Tihe court's role is limited to
determining whether [the railroad's] assertion is 'even "arguable.' "), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848
(1986).
445. See Burgoon, Mediation Under the Railway Labor Act, in THE RAILWAY ACT AT
FIFTY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES 71, 72
(1976).
446. Id.
447. 362 U.S. 330 (1960). For a discussion of Telegraphers, see supra notes 355-62 and
accompanying text.
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by filing a Section 6 notice."' That amendment would have pre-
vented management from abolishing railroad stations, an action that
would have resulted in the elimination of jobs." 9 Today, most air-
lines use agreements that have fixed termination dates or that are
amendable on certain dates.45 ° In either case, Section 6 notices usu-
ally open the full range of agreements to bargaining.45
In his dissent from the Eastern Furlough 11 denial of a rehearing
en banc, Judge Edwards reasoned that the status quo requires parties
to adhere to the terms of their expired collective bargaining agree-
ment, as well as to working conditions, while bargaining over a new
agreement.452 The RLA mandates that a Section 6 notice be filed over
disputes relating to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.453
Thus, when a party files a Section 6 notice regarding the statutorily-
defined topics during the post-expiration period, the dispute " 'look[s]
to the acquisition of rights for the future' "414 and automatically trig-
gers a major dispute.455
Under an extension of Judge Edwards' view, the filing of Section
6 notices during the post-expiration period would be similar to creat-
ing mandatory topics of bargaining under the NLRA in any dispute
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. This interpreta-
tion of the RLA preserves labor's opportunity to acquire new rights in
the statutorily mandated areas while bargaining over a new collective
agreement.
2. POST-EXPIRATION ARBITRATION
When a management prerogative issue is classified as minor, the
question arises whether, in disputes occurring after expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrability of the dispute and
the rights granted to the parties by the expired agreement survive the
agreement. In Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confechionery
448. Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 332.
449. Id.
450. See Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Pan Am. World Airways, 765 F.2d 377, 382 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding that RLA agreements may have termination dates); Campbell & Hiers,
Carriers' Rights to Self-Help During Strikes, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR
RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 221, 228-29 (J. McKelvey ed. 1988).
451. Burgoon, supra note 445, at 72.
452. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891, 913, 921 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Eastern Furlough II) (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
453. Id.
454. Id. (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945), aff'd on reh'g, 327
U.S. 661 (1946)).
455. Id.
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Workers Union,45 6 an NLRA employer that closed a bakery refused to
arbitrate the union's claim for severance pay, maintaining that its con-
tractual obligation to arbitrate had expired with the agreement.457
The United States Supreme Court held that the parties' confidence in
the arbitration process does not terminate with the agreement, and
thus disputes concerning expired contractual rights continue to be
subject to binding arbitration.45 The Court held that arbitration is
presumed in the post-expiration period unless the parties contract
otherwise.459
In contrast, the related RLA issue is more enigmatic. Under the
RLA, the issue of whether post-expiration contractual rights are arbi-
trable is intertwined with the issue of what limits define the parties'
working conditions while they are bargaining over a new collective
agreement. If the expired agreement and past practices comprise the
status quo, does the court or the system board define those rights?
Are there, in fact, surviving contractual rights, or are the rights more
appropriately designated as new ones that are subject to bargaining?
In his separate concurring opinion to the denial of a rehearing en
banc for Eastern Furlough 1I, 460 Judge Silberman appeared to con-
clude that, because the expiration of an agreement extinguishes enti-
tlements and because past practices are insufficient to create
entitlements, the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement nec-
essarily forecloses arbitration of disputes.46' Judge Edwards, dissent-
ing from the en banc decision, disagreed. 462  According to Judge
Edwards, a unilateral action by management in an agreement's post-
expiration period gives rise both to an arbitrable issue of whether
labor had any accrued rights under the expired agreement and to a
bargainable issue of new contractual claims.463 Thus, Judge Edwards'
conclusion is compatible with the NLRA's presumption of arbi-
456. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
457. Id. at 247.
458. Id. at 254.
459. Id. at 255.
460. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough II), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
461. Id. at 927. (Silberman, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Flight
Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, 359 F.2d 303, 310-11 (2d Cir. 1966)) ("Expiration of
agreement releases employer from obligation to submit to system board otherwise minor
disputes turning on provisions of extinct agreement."). But see Nolde Bros. v. Local 358,
Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 247 (1977) (holding that under the
NLRA, the "duty to arbitrate exists with respect to entitlements based on and surviving
expired agreement").
462. Eastern Furlough II, 863 F.2d at 919 (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
463. Id. at 922-23.
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trability for expired collective bargaining agreements. His view also
seems to reach beyond Nolde to accept the continuation of contrac-
tual rights during the post-expiration period.4
If the terms of a collective bargaining agreement survive its expi-
ration, two possible conflicts could arise from the interaction between
major and minor disputes in the post-expiration period. The first con-
flict also arises in mid-term disputes, and it is illustrated in St. Louis
Southwestern Railway v. United Transportation Union,465 in which a
dispute may be presented to a system board for a decision about
whether a moratorium clause in an expired agreement would control
the bargainability of an issue.
The second conflict between major and minor disputes in the
post-expiration period arises when a dispute has both major and
minor aspects, as Judge Edwards suggested was the case in the East-
ern Furlough II dispute.466 Judge Edwards indicated that the parties
in situations like the furlough dispute should bargain over the fur-
lough as a new right while arbitration would settle any claims to
accrued rights (such as, presumably, insurance benefits) under the col-
lective agreement.467 During this time, the status quo would control.
Management would not be able to act unilaterally, if that action is
inconsistent with the expired agreement and past working conditions,
until a new collective agreement is negotiated. The fact that manage-
ment cannot act would also inhibit its power during arbitration; thus,
in both forums, management's relative position typically would be
weaker than labor's.
The difficulty in arriving at a balanced solution to management
prerogative issues in the post-expiration period under the RLA
largely results from the imbalance in the present application of major
and minor classifications. Although the major classification is too
heavily leveraged for labor when agreements are either in force or
expired, the minor classification, which is essentially a grievance pro-
cedure, is an inadequate mechanism for collective bargaining pur-
poses. The minor classification may leave labor at a disadvantage
because labor has no economic weapon and no opportunity to bargain
464. Judge Edwards stated: "Thus, for example, it would be possible for a union to...
claim that employees had 'accrued' rights under an expired agreement including a right to
arbitrate their grievances protecting them from layoffs pending negotiation of a new
agreement." Id. at 922.
465. 646 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of St. Louis Southwestern, see supra
notes 401-11 and accompanying text.
466. Eastern Furlough 11, 863 F.2d at 922 (Edwards, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
467. Id. at 922-23.
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over future rights. It must restrict its arguments to those derived
from existing or expired collective agreements regarding the agree-
ment's implied limitations, past practices, and the parties' intent.
Some balance in relative power is maintained in light of the fact that,
even without a simultaneous major dispute, management does not
have an unfettered license to act. Management, moreover, may con-
tain its own actions in light of the possibility that the system board
may grant damages to the union.
The courts' various interpretations of the RLA during the post-
expiration period give the parties to a collective bargaining agreement
little guidance regarding their rights while resolving disputes and cre-
ating new agreements. The interchange of definitions regarding the
status quo and dispute classification has resulted in a circularity of
functions within the bargaining and arbitration forums of the RLA.
VI. A STREAMLINED STATUTE
In addition to the courts' struggle to adapt the Railway Labor
Act to today's deregulated airline market, efforts to revise the RLA's
major and minor classifications have taken place within the airline
industry itself. In some instances, labor has successfully negotiated
for expedited arbitration procedures to replace the sluggish statutory
procedures of the minor classification. 468 Faster, less costly steps have
eliminated all but the last step in the arbitration process-a three-
person arbitration board-or have substituted a single neutral arbitra-
tor for the statutory procedure. 469
This more efficient version of the RLA's minor dispute resolution
procedure would have a significant impact on the effect of the heavy
presumption of arbitrability for mid-term disputes advanced by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Eastern Pilots.47° Because manage-
ment is free to act pending the resolution of arbitration, with an arbi-
trator's potential damage award as its only deterrent, a more
expedited procedure would reduce the extent of the effects of any
managerial action and thereby better protect the employees' interests.
468. See Crable, System Boards of Adjustment: The State of Expedited Arbitration, in
CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 255 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1988); Singer, Pan Am's Experience with Expedited Arbitration Procedures, in
CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION 261 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1988).
469. Crable, supra note 468, at 256-57. Thus, the parties avoid the time and expense of the
longer procedure in cases where a deadlock is inevitable and the four-member board would be
a formality. See also Singer, supra note 468, at 262.
470. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Eastern Pilots II).
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Additionally, the ready availability of a status quo injunction would
increase the possibility that employees would be sufficiently compen-
sated with an award.47'
The major classification, however, remains cumbersome. When
Congress structured the RLA, it installed the elaborate major dispute
procedure in order to prevent interruption to commerce and to pro-
tect employees in the highly regulated railroad industry.472 The dis-
pute resolution process thus reflects the notion that parties whose
economic strengths are somewhat evenly balanced may profit from an
extended opportunity to resolve their differences. In the modern mar-
ketplace, however, additional alternative sources of transportation
within the airline industry and without the railroad industry are avail-
able. Consequently, there is reduced risk that a strike against a single
carrier in those industries would cripple commerce.
Courts addressing the major-minor classification issue therefore
have less reason to be motivated by the policy that existed when the
RLA was formed. Many courts understandably are reluctant to place
disputes in the major classification, where management may be
unduly constrained from effectively competing in the deregulated
market. These courts have applied the NLRA's management prerog-
ative doctrine to carrier restructuring decisions, with the result that a
dispute is now termed minor rather than major, as was the case in the
regulated past. The use of the NLRA doctrine to move disputes to
the minor classification and grant RLA management greater latitude
471. The Supreme Court has stated:
From the point of view of these employees, the critical point in the dispute may
be when the change is made, for, by the time of the frequently long-delayed
Board decision, it might well be impossibile to make them whole in any realistic
sense .... [A status quo injunction] would operate to preserve [the Board's]
jurisdiction by preventing injury so irreparable that a decision of the Board in the
unions' favor would be but an empty victory.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960).
For a discussion of the availability of status quo injunctions pending the resolution of minor
disputes, see supra note 411 and accompanying text.
472. The purposes of the RLA are:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among
employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right
of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete
independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to
carry out the purposes of this Act; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions;
(5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out
of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
RLA § l(a), 45 U.S.C. § 151(a).
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is a move that may be effective during the term of an agreement if
injunctive relief is available to prohibit management from unilaterally
implementing actions that would render the arbitration process virtu-
ally meaningless.
When courts apply the presumption of arbitrability to disputes
arising after the expiration of an agreement, however, they create
inapposite results and a disparity in bargaining power. By classifying
post-expiration restructuring disputes as minor, courts interpreting
the RLA deprive unions-then involved in bargaining over a new col-
lective agreement-of the opportunity to create new rights from the
disputed rights in the bargaining forum. When the shift to arbitration
occurs during this time frame, it limits labor's arguments to topics
covered or implied by an expired collective bargaining agreement and
it denies labor the use of its economic strength while allowing man-
agement to take unilateral action.
By thus presuming arbitrability in the post-expiration period,
courts have diminished labor's rights in the collective bargaining pro-
cess. The courts' attempt to reshape the RLA appears to be an effort
to arrive at a similar conceptual plane for labor-management relations
within both the NLRA and the RLA. The courts' dual objectives-
of freeing RLA management from the often tedious constraints of the
major dispute classification and harmonizing the policy concerns of
the two statutes-is possible through a more restrained application of
the major classification. The length of the major dispute procedure
has already been somewhat shortened in recent years with the dor-
mancy of the emergency board procedure.473 Additionally, the major
classification's arbitration procedure, which requires the mutual con-
sent of the parties for its utilization, is virtually nonexistent.
474
Thus, on a practical level, the predominant factor distinguishing
the RLA's collective bargaining procedure from that of the NLRA is
473. For a description of the emergency board procedure, see supra note 117. See also
Curtin, supra note 32, at 187. Former Secretary of Labor George Schultz adopted an informal
policy abandoning the procedure during the Nixon administration. Id. (citing Cullen,
Emergency Boards under the Railway Labor Act, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES 154-56 (1976)).
Subsequent administrations have followed suit. Id.
For a discussion of the "remarkable unsuccess" of emergency boards before deregulation,
see Comment, supra note 66, at 480-81.
474. Refusal to accept the National Mediation Board's offer of arbitration, however, may
deprive the refusing party of the right to injunctive relief based on a claim of bad faith
negotiations. T. KHEEL, supra note 117, § 50.05(1], at 50-28. Before deregulation, carriers
used arbitration as a means to be "compelled" into accepting a wage increase, thereby adding
credibility to requests to the Civil Aeronautics Board for fare increases. Comment, supra note
66, at 480.
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the RLA's requirement of governmentally supervised mediation . 5
One might argue that any imposition of quasi-judicial mediation upon
the airline industry defeats the spirit of collective bargaining.476 In
any event, it is apparent that mediation may too often alter the result
of the collective bargaining process. 4 " When mediation over a recent
labor-management agreement at Eastern Air Lines extended over a
year,478 the duration of the process delayed the economic self-help
that would have resolved the dispute more quickly. 7 9 The use of
mediation in a more restrained manner, followed more quickly by
impasse and any necessary economic force, is more in keeping with
the faster results necessary for industry survival in a competitive mar-
ketplace. It would work well to more accurately balance the bargain-
ing positions of RLA parties, who, like NLRA parties, could rely on
economic strength rather than the time factor of the procedure to
determine the outcome of disputes.
Were a more practical version of the major dispute procedure
available when the disputes arose in Eastern Furlough 11480 and
Trump Shuttle,48' the District of Columbia Circuit would have been
able to take a more balanced approach to those cases. Instead of
holding that those disputes were minor, thereby damaging labor's
rights during the parties' bargaining over a new collective agreement,
the court would have been able to place the disputes in the major
classification, thereby preserving the policy underlying the RLA and
freeing management from much of its time constraints.482 The new
major classification would permit the parties, rather than the forced
475. For a comparison of the quasi-judicial nature of RLA mediation to the voluntary
nature of NLRA mediation, see supra note 119.
476. One commentator has argued that the purpose of airline mediation diminished with
the parties' increased sophistication in collective bargaining techniques. Comment, supra note
66, at 479. Additionally, mandated mediation may decrease the parties' efforts to resolve
disputes themselves. Id.
477. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Transamerica Airlines, 817 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1986)
(mediation continued in excess of two years); Lan Chile Airlines v. National Mediation Board,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3655 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (mediation had been going on for sixteen months);
Start the Clock on Eastern Air Lines, Miami Herald, Jan. 12, 1989, at A26, col. 1. (mediation
had continued for a year).
478. Start the Clock on Eastern Air Lines, Miami Herald, Jan. 12, 1989, at A26, col. 1.
479. For a discussion of the relative power of bargaining parties with respect to economic
self-help, see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
480. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Eastern Furlough H), reh'g en banc denied, 863 F.2d 891, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
481. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1988)
(Trump Shuttle).
482. The Trump Shuttle result would now be affected by the recent Supreme Court case,
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 2584
(1989) (P&LE II), which did not require management to maintain the status quo pending
effects bargaining.
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time constraints, to determine the outcome of their dispute by relying
more directly on their economic strength during the bargaining
process.
Although economic warfare is not the means of choice in resolv-
ing disputes, neither is the forced protraction of mediation that may
nevertheless eventually result in a strike. In a case involving a finan-
cially distraught carrier similar to Eastern Air Lines, it is ironic that:
A bargaining order, and a status quo injunction, designed to foster
conciliation, promote labor peace, and ultimately keep the [carrier]
running, may ultimately have the perverse effect of destroying the
only chance [the carrier] has for survival and perhaps even the very
jobs that the unions are ... trying to protect.48 3
When parties cannot resolve their disputes within a reasonable length
of time, self-help is the best alternative.
ELIZABETH L. COCANOUGHER
483. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 845 F.2d 420, 446 (3d
Cir. 1988) (P&LE I), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989) (P&LE II).
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